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Federal Habeas Corpus and Ineffective
Representation of Counsel: The
Supreme Court Has Work To Do
Peter W. Tague*

The availability of federal habeas corpus relief for state criminal
defendants has always borne a complex relationship to state rules
barring defendants from litigating constitutional claims in state court
because of procedural defaults in raising those claims. 1 The Warren
Court's landmark attempt to resolve this relationship was the 1963
decision in Fay v. Noia, 2 which asserted that a state procedural forfeiture rule could not bar federal habeas review of a constitutional
claim unless the defendant had "deliberately bypassed" the procedural opportunity to raise the claim;3 the Court defined "deliberate
bypass" in terms of a defendant's intentional and voluntary relin*
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1. Though it concentrates on the availability of federal habeas relief for a state defendant who violates a state procedural rule governing the timing of objections, the discussion in
this article also generally applies to the availability of federal habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1970) for the federally convicted defendant who violates the timing requirements of FED. R.
CRIM. P. 12.
2. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). For a brief survey of the inconsistent treatment of this problem
by the federal courts before 1963, see id at 414-26.
3. Id at 438-39. The petitioner, Noia, serving a life sentence for felony murder, had
chosen not to appeal directly his claim that the prosecution had coerced his confession in
violation of the fifth amendment. But the Fay Court held that Noia's decision not to appeal
was not a "deliberate bypass," because he had faced a "grisly choice" between a prison sentence and the risk of a death sentence on retrial. Id at 439-40.
Fay recognized that the states had a legitimate interest in "exacting compliance with
their procedural rules," id at 431, but it held that this interest was sufficiently vindicated by
the defendant's loss of any right to direct or collateral review in the state courts and direct
review by the United States Supreme Court. Id at 433.
(A stylistic point: This article uses the terms "defendant" and "petitioner" interchangeably to refer to the defendant who petitions for federal habeas corpus review, the choice
determined by clarity within context.)
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quishment of a known right.' Even when, 2 years later, in Heny v.
MLz'sissippi,5 the Warren Court ruled that state procedural defaults
could bar post-conviction state review6 as well as direct Supreme
Court review of a federal claim, 7 it left open the Fay avenue to federal habeas relief.8
But the Warren Court left several crucial questions unresolved for
lower courts. Did the defendant or the attorney control the defense
case for the purposes of habeas law?9 If counsel's decision not to
raise a constitutional claim by objecting at trial could eliminate the
defendant's right to get all state post-conviction review and direct
review by the Court, could that decision also ever eliminate the defendant's right to federal habeas review of the claim?' 0 If so, were
there nonetheless certain federal rights that only the defendant could
waive before federal habeas review would be barred? If counsel's
decision could bind the client, what sort of decision did counsel have
to make? Could the attorney's decision not to object to a constitutional infringement bind the client even if the attorney had failed to
research the relevant law, or investigate the facts, or appreciate the
relationship of the law to the facts?" Could the defense counsel
bind the defendant if the counsel did not even know an objection was
4. Id at 439 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
5. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
6. Id at 447. Whether the purpose of the state's procedural rule is legitimate remained
a federal constitutional question. Id at 447-48. The Court also reserved the right to determine whether the legitimate state interest was satisfied by counsel's conduct even if such
conduct did not technically comply with the rule. See id at 448-49 (attorney's motion for
directed verdict satisfied state's interest in timely decision of motions to suppress evidence).
7. Id at450-51.
8. See id at 452. On subsequent habeas review, the federal district court, after finding
that neither Henry nor his counsel had deliberately bypassed the opportunity to raise the
fourth amendment issue, reversed the conviction on its merits. Henry v. Williams, 299 F.
Supp. 36 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
9. Some post-Fay courts applied a very fluid standard to this problem, examining the
"stage of the proceedings at which the decision is made, the significance of the legal consequences which attach to the decision, the practical necessities of the adversary system, the
degree to which counsel has an adequate opportunity to consult with the client before the
decision is made, and the degree to which society has entrusted counsel to make independent
judgments in his role as an advocate." United States ex rel Brown v. Warden, 417 F. Supp.
970, 973 (N.D. Ill. 1976). Others held that Heng empowered counsel to make every decision
unless the defendant could show "exceptional circumstances" to justify application of Fay.
E.g., Winters v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1973).
10. Hen,'s discussion of whether only the defendant's waiver of the opportunity to object could bar federal habeas is unclear. See 379 U.S. at 450-52. Some lower courts interpreted Heng to mean that counsel's deliberate bypass could bar federal habeas. Compare
Nelson v. Califrnia, 346 F.2d 73, 81 (9th Cir. 1965) (yes), with Henry v. Williams, 299 F.
Supp. 36 (N.D. Miss. 1969) (no). For a discussion of Henq,'s ambiguities, see Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 980-92 (1965).
11. Compare Kuhl v. United States, 370 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1966) (deliberate bypass where
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possible? Could the defendant challenge the competency of the
counsel's decision, even if that decision barred all review of the merits
of the issue counsel did not raise? 12 Which side-the defense or the
government-had the burdens of production and persuasion on deliberate bypass?' 3
Federal courts struggled with these questions, 4 and answered
them in different ways. The differences in approach resulted in part
from the different ways in which the courts treated a record that did
not clearly reveal why the defense had not objected. Although the
federal appellate courts occasionally remanded to the district court to
develop that information, 5 they usually reviewed the record in an
attempt to infer the attorney's trial strategy. If counsel's failure to
object was consistent with his apparent trial strategy-if the attorney
had, for example, affirmatively used the very evidence at trial that,
on collateral attack, the defendant claimed the government should6
not have used-some appellate courts found deliberate bypass.'
Other appellate courts found deliberate bypass by speculating that
counsel mistaken as to standing to raise legal issue), with Pineda v. Craven, 424 F.2d 369 (9th
Cir. 1970) (no deliberate bypass where counsel unaware of controlling precedent).
12. Most courts found no ineffective representation where counsel overlooked only one
constitutional objection. See, e.g., People v. Washington, 41111. 2d 16, 241 N.E.2d 425 (1968).
13. See notes 180-87 infra and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., United States ex rel Brown v. Warden, 417 F. Supp. 970, 972 (N.D. Ill.
1976) (noting "ambiguity" in Fap test of deliberate bypass). The ever-increasing scholarly
criticism of Fay and Heng, by judges magnified the problem of interpreting the decisions. See
Burger, The State oftheJudicia.7-1970,56 A.B.A.J. 929, 931 (1970); Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttackon CriminalJudgments,38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142, 170-71 (1970); Gibbons,
Waiver: The QwestjorFunctionalLimitations on Habeas CorpusJurdiction,2 SETON HALL L. REV.
291 (1971); Haynsworth, Improving the Handling of Ciminal Cases in the FederalAppellate System,
59 CORNELL L. REv. 597, 601-04 (1974).
15. See, e.g., Johns v. Perini, 440 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1972) (remand to determine whether
counsel had tactically decided not to give notice of alibi); cf. United States v. Greer, 538 F.2d
437, 441 n. 11 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (urging that evidentiary hearing always be held to determine
whether attorney failed to act for tactical reasons).
16. See United States ex ret Terry v. Henderson, 462 F.2d 1125, 1128-29 (2d Cir. 1972)
(deliberate bypass where counsel did not object to confession and used it to win acquittal on
one count); United States ex re. Cruz v. LaVallee, 448 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 958 (1972) (deliberate bypass where counsel did not object to confession but used it to
show mitigating circumstances); cf. Winters v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1973) (deliberate
bypass where counsel chose not to object to grand jury so as to negotiate a favorable plea
bargain). Where an attorney raised the issue of potential prejudice but did not object, some
courts held the defendant to have bypassed the opportunity to object. See, e.g., Rodriguez v.
Estelle, 536 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1976) (counsel's failure to move for mistrial or otherwise
object to two jurors having read news account of defendant's 1,500-year sentence in another
case, after counsel himself had raised issue before trial court, held a deliberate bypass). But
the Supreme Court itself held in Henr, that counsel's mere attempt to rebut evidence to which
no timely objection had been made did not in itself comprise bypass. 379 U.S. at 446.
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7
the attorney might have believed that the objection would fail.'
Still other courts found no deliberate bypass if they could discern no
tactical purpose served by the failure to object. 8 And some courts
simply avoided the question without considering whether the attorney had deliberately bypassed the opportunity to object.' 9
These differences among the federal habeas courts made it important for the Supreme Court to define deliberate bypass further if the
Court wanted that test to serve as a fair and effective limit on federal
habeas relief Three recent cases, Estelle v. Williams, 20 Francis v.
Henderson,2 ' and Wainwright v. Sykes, 22 presented the Burger Court
with opportunities to do so. But, rather than clarify the deliberate
bypass test, the Court used these opportunities to replace it with an
entirely new, unnecessarily obscure, and far more restrictive test: requiring habeas petitioners to show "cause" for and "prejudice" resulting from their procedural failure in raising federal claims in state

court.2 3

Estelle, Francis, and Sykes reflect the Burger Court's assiduous ef24
fort to restrict the availability of federal habeas corpus relief.
17. See Whitney v. United States, 513 F.2d 326, 329 (8th Cir. 1974) (suppression motion); United States ex rel Broaddus v. Rundle, 429 F.2d 791, 795 (3d Cir. 1970) (admissibility of confession); cf. United States ex rel. Brown v. Warden, 417 F. Supp. 970 (N.D. Ill. 1976)
(bypass found where counsel admits he failed to make objection because he thought it was
frivolous).
18. See, e.g., Minor v. Black, 527 F.2d I (6th Cir. 1975) (no deliberate bypass where
nothing in record indicated why counsel had not objected to admission of and government's
comment on evidence of defendant's pretrial silence used for impeachment purpose).
19. See Setz v. California, 423 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1970); cf. United States v. Blitz, 533
F.2d 1329 (2d Cir. 1976) (grand jury attack waived under FED. R. GRIM. P. 12, but court
decides merits); United States v. Maretti, 323 F. Supp. 683 (D. Del. 1971) (court reaches
merits after deciding no cause shown to excuse failure to follow time provisions of FED. R.
GRIM. P. 12; ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES § 2.1, at 36 & Comm. § 6.1(a) (App. Draft 1968)
[hereinafter cited as ABA POsT-CONvICTION REMEDIES] (habeas court should deny petition,
if unmeritorious, rather than decide issue of deliberate bypass); Friendly, suwra note 14, at
158-59. Courts have usually used this approach in denying the petition either because its
allegations lacked merit or because the alleged constitutional error was harmless.
20. 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
21. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
22. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
23. See id at 87. In creating this test, the Court never explained why further development of the bypass restriction would not have achieved the Court's perceived goals. The
Warren Court itself, perhaps realizing that Fay could have allowed reversal on federal habeas
of every conviction where a constitutional violation had occurred, may have developed the
doctrines of retroactivity, see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), and harmless error,
see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), in order to develop controls on the impact of
24. Earlier Burger Court decisions restricting federal habeas review on grounds of petitioners' waiver or forfeiture include ToIlett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) (guilty plea
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Though recent commentary 25 has focused on the severe limitations
26
placed on habeas relief by the Court's decision in Stone v. Powell,
which all but eliminated federal habeas review of state court decisions on fourth amendment claims, Estelle, Franci', and Sykes will
probably restrict federal habeas relief far more. But these new decisions may ultimately fail to achieve the Court's goals of reducing the
federal habeas workload and alleviating friction between state and
federal courts, since the new cases may invite state criminal defendants to transform their constitutional claims into attacks on their attorneys' competency for having failed to raise those claims, and
thereby find a new and still open, if somewhat circuitous, route to the
federal courts.
This article examines the complex effects of Estelle, Francis, and
Sykes. Part I traces the emergence in those cases of the new "cause
and prejudice" rule. Part II explains the criteria by which the courts
will probably apply it. Part III criticizes the new rule for unnecessarily restricting access to federal habeas review while failing to fulfill
waives review of constitutional claims on matters antedating plea); Davis v. United' States,
411 U.S. 233 (1973) (failure to raise timely claim of illegal grand jury waived under FED. R.
CRINI. P. 12(b)(2)); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (habeas review of allegedly
coerced confession waived by guilty plea); cf. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977) (holding
constitutional District of Columbia statute barring habeas petition to federal district courts
for defendants failing to move for collateral relief under special statutory alternative). But see
Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975) (state law allowing state post-conviction review of
claims arising before guilty plea does not bar federal habeas review of those claims).
The Burger Court has restricted federal habeas relief in a way that Congress has not
chosen to do. Recent legislative proposals to limit federal habeas jurisdiction have failed.
See, e.g., S. 567, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 13,722, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); 123
CoNG. REG. S6025-41 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1977) (statement by Senators Nelson and Mathias
on proposed legislative restrictions); Note, JroposedModftationof FederalHabeas CorpusforState
Pisoners-Reform or Revocation?, 61 GEO. L.J. 1221 (1973) (criticizing proposed legislation).
The Burger Court's restrictions were no surprise. Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the
Court's opinions in Sykes and in Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), see notes 68-70
infta and accompanying text, testified, while still an Assistant Attorney General, that Congress should restrict federal habeas jurisdiction in much the way that the Court did in Sykes.
See Hearingson S 895 Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights ofthe SenateJudarv Comm., 92d
Cong., Ist Sess. 93-121 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Rehnquist Testimony].
25. See, e.g., Flagg, Stone v. Powell and the New Federalism: A Challenge to Congress, 14
HARV. J. LEGIs. 152, 162-63 (1976); Green, Stone v. Powell: The Hermeneutics of the Burger Court,
10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 655 (1977); Robbins & Sanders, JudicialIntegri, The Appearance of
Justice, And The Great Writ ofHaeasCorpus: How To Kill Two Thirds (Or More) With One Stone,
15 Aai. CRIM. L. REv. 63 (1977); Note, A Modest Proposa- Habeas Corpus, the Exclusionag Rule
and the Supreme Court, 7 MEM. ST. L. REV. 85 (1976).
26. 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (denying habeas review of fourth amendment claim that petitioner had full and fair opportunity to litigate in state court, because claim does not go to
issue of guilt or innocence; deterrent value of exclusionary rule outweighed by social cost of
extending rule to habeas review).
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or actually undermining some of the Court's primary goals in creating the "cause and prejudice" test. Part IV explains how federal
habeas petitioners may now exploit the Court's unintended invitation to petition for relief on grounds of the incompetency of their
attorneys in failing to meet state procedural rules, and suggests the
work the Court must do if it intends to close off the loophole left open
in these decisions.
I.
A.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE "CAUSE AND PREJUDICE" RULE

Estelle v. Williams

The evisceration of Fay v. Noa in favor of a new restrictive barrier
to federal habeas relief was heralded, ironically, by a case in which
the majority of the Court never even addressed the question of
habeas corpus. Estelle v. Williams 7 resolved the issue of the failure of
a defendant and his counsel to raise a constitutional claim at trial by
treating that failure, in effect, as negating the very existence of the
defendant's claim. Of the majority, only Justice Powell even recognized the issue of waiver or procedural forfeiture of a substantive
claim. 28 And only Justice Brennan's dissent recognized that the
Court was retrenching its decision in Fay to allow federal habeas review to defendants whose failure to object does not amount to a deliberate bypass.29
A Texas jury convicted Harry Lee Williams of assault with intent
to commit murder with malice.30 Before the trial began, Williams'
jailor had denied the defendant's request to change into civilian
clothes. 3 ' Neither Williams nor his attorney objected to the trial
judge that Williams' appearance in jail dress might prejudice the
jury. But, in contrast to Louisiana and Florida, whose procedural
default statutes played a major role in Francisv. Henderson and Wainwright v. Sykes, 32 Texas apparently had no contemporaneous objec33
tion rule that barred appellate review of an issue not raised at trial.
27. 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
28. Id at 513-15 (Powell, J., concurring).
29. Id at 523-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
30. Id at 502.
31. Id at 502. No issue was made of the possibility that the defendant's request to his
jailor had put the state-and thus the trial court--on notice of the defendant's fear of jury
prejudice.
32. See notes 67 & 83 infra and accompanying text.
33. The Texas appellate court mentions no such rule. See Williams v. State, 477
S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). In any event, because that court decided the merits of the
jail clothes issue even though the defendant had not objected, the issue could be relitigated on
federal habeas under Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 460-65 (1953).
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On direct appeal, the Texas courts affirmed the conviction.3 4 On
federal collateral attack, Williams claimed that his counsel had been
constitutionally ineffective and that his jail dress had violated his due
process right to a fair trial. 5 During an evidentiary hearing on
habeas review in the federal court, Williams and his attorney both
testified that they had not wanted the defendant to wear jail clothes
and had feared that the clothes might prejudice the jury.36 Counsel
had not objected at trial because he had thought it futile to do so; he
believed that the practice of the trial judge and other judges in that
He
district was to have non-bailed defendants tried in jail clothes.
was wrong: In an affidavit submitted to the habeas court, the trial
judge said he would have let Williams change into civilian clothes if
only he had asked." The attorney also did not know that the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals had earlier held that an appearance by the
defendant in jail clothes was inherently prejudicial.3 9 The federal
district court concluded that neither Williams nor his attorney had
deliberately bypassed the opportunity to object, 40 a point apparently
conceded by the state in the habeas proceeding. 4 ' But the district
court denied the petition on its merits. Rather than focusing on the
failure to object to the jail clothes, the court considered defense counsel's overall performance and concluded that he had not been ineffective.4 2 The district court also held that although Williams'
appearance in jail clothes was inherently prejudicial, it was harmless
34. Williams v. State, 477 S.W.2d 24 (i'ex. Crim. App. 1972). In his direct appeal, Williams argued that his appearance in jail clothes had violated due process, id at 26, that his
attorney had been ineffective, id at 27, and that the trial court should have instructed on selfdefense, id at 25. The Texas appeals court interpreted Williams' failure to object as a choice
to go to trial in jail clothes. Id at 26. Moreover, the court refused to review the self-defense
instruction, because counsel had not objected at trial, and concluded that counsel's overall
performance had not made the trial "a farce." Id at 27. The court did not discuss whether
counsel's specific failure to object to the jail clothes constituted ineffective representation.
Although the court noted that counsel had cross-examined the government's witnesses, id at
27, Williams' appellate counsel indicated that trial counsel had conducted virtually no crossexamination, perhaps because there was a dispute over the fee. Interview with appellate counsel (Mar. 18, 1977).
35. Williams v. Beto, 364 F. Supp. 335, 336, 339 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
36. Petitioner's Appendix to the Supreme Court at 47, 58, 73, 74.
37. Williams v. Beto, 364 F. Supp. 335, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
38. Id at 338.
39. Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967).
40. The district court found that the defense had not committed a deliberate bypass
because the trial judge's willingness to permit defendants to wear civilian clothes was neither
publicly known nor known by the defense. Williams v. Beto, 364 F. Supp. 335, 343 (S.D. Tex.
1973).
41. Petitioner's Appendix to the Supreme Court at 38.
42. Williams v. Beto, 364 F. Supp. 335, 339 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court
that the defense had not deliberately bypassed the opportunity to

object, explaining that jail clothes were customarily worn in that judicial district-so that counsel might have assumed that an objection
would have been overruled-and finding no evidence that counsel's
failure to object was tactically motivated.4 The court of appeals
reversed, however, disagreeing with the district court's finding that
the error involving the jail dress was harmless, since the defendant's

appearance might have dissuaded the jury from convicting him of a
lesser offense. 5
The Supreme Court reinstated the conviction in an enigmatic decision. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger incorporated
the defense's failure to object to the claimed due process violation
into a reinterpretation of the due process right, and thereby denied
that the violation had ever occurred: Because the right to appear in
civilian clothes is a "trial-type

' 46

right rather than a "fundamental"

right, the right is not violated unless the trial court "compels" the
defendant to wear jail clothes. 7 The Court apparently thought that
43. Id at 344.
44. Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206, 208 (5th Cir. 1974).
45. Id at 210-12.
46. The term is Justice Powell's. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 514 (1976) (Powell,
J., concurring). The ChiefJustice spoke of rights involving "strategic and tactical" decisions
by the defense, distinguishing them from a decision involving the right to counsel. Id.at 512.
47. Id at 507. The Court interpreted the Fifth Circuit's decisions as requiring a defense objection to the jail clothes to trigger a due process violation. Although the question is
not free from doubt, that interpretation is probably wrong. In Hernandez v. Beto, 443 F.2d
634 (5th Cir. 1971), the Fifth Circuit reversed petitioner's state conviction even though
neither Hernandez nor his counsel had requested permission for civilian clothes and despite
the fact that counsel had raised no objection at trial. Though Hernandez, like Williams, was
only being held in jail awaiting trial, his counsel did not raise an objection to the jail clothing,
because he believed from past experience that such a motion would have been denied as
frivolous. Id at 636. In United States x retl Stahl v. Henderson, 472 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 971 (1972), the Fifth Circuit did characterize Hernandez as saying that the
defense must object at the trial to the wearing of the jail clothes. Id at 557. It then added,
however, that in Hernandez the defendant had met this burden. Id This is a curious interpretation of Hrnandez, given the fact that no objection was raised at the trial level. The court
seems to have implied that the failure to object is not, in every instance, to be equated with a
deliberate choice by the defendant. In Henandez, the court stated that, given the reason for
the attorney's failure to object, the circumstances could not justify inferring a voluntary
waiver by the defendant. Hernandez v. Beto, 443 F.2d 634, 637 (5th Cir. 1971). In contrast,
a Texas state court presumed in the absence of any explanation that Williams had deliberately decided not to object. Williams v. State, 477 S.W.2d 24, 26-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
The Fifth Circuit was impressed by the fact that Hernandez was being held in jail awaiting trial. It considered this proof that his jail clothes had prejudiced him at trial. In Stahl,
however, petitioner was already a prison inmate both at the time that he allegedly committed
the new crime and when he stood trial for that crime. The court of appeals therefore found
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the trial judge would have "compelled" the defendant only by overruling an objection.
Had the Court stopped with this syllogism, Estelle might have
had little impact on the availability of federal habeas review, applying only to the substantive question of a defendant's right to wear
civilian clothes. 8 But, in a footnote,4 9 the Court went on to speak in
terms that could work a broad restriction on federal habeas review
for defendants failing to raise constitutional claims at trial, even if
the state has no contemporaneous objection rule. In this footnote, the
Court appeared to link the new distinction between fundamental
and trial-type rights to the distinction between counseled and uncounseled decisions. If the decision not to object could involve a tactical choice, the right at issue is not fundamental; a decision is
tactical-and the underlying right thus nonfundamental-if it is
made with the benefit of counsel, because only counsel can be expected to recognize the tactical consequences of failing to object.5 °
no prejudice, since the prison clothes could only reveal to the jury facts it already knew from
the evidence at trial. United States ex reL Stahl v. Henderson, 472 F.2d at 557.
The Fifth Circuit's position on this issue is not easily summarized, since the court "paints
with a broad brush these types of cases. Each case must be considered in its own factual
context." 443 F.2d at 637. But, given Henandz, one cannot conclude as confidently as did
the Supreme Court in Estelle that the Fifth Circuit has uniformly required that an objection
to jail clothes be lodged.
48. See Haggard v. Alabama, 550 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1977) (absent objection, Estelle
bars federal habeas review of defendant's appearance before jury in handcuffs).
49. 425 U.S. at 508 n.3.
50. The actual language of footnote 3 states: "We are not confronted with an alleged
relinquishment of a fundamental right of the sort at issue injohnson v. Zrbst. . . . There, the
Court understandably found it difficult to conceive of an accused making a knowing decision
to forgo the fundamental right to the assistance of counsel, absent a showing of conscious
surrender of a known right. The Court has not, however, engaged in this exacting analysis
with respect to strategic and tactical decisions, even those with constitutional implications, by
a counseled accused. . . . The reason for this rule is clear: if the defendant has an objection,
there is an obligation to call the matter to the court's attention so the trial judge will have an
opportunity to remedy the situation." 425 U.S. at 508 n.3 (citations omitted).
Footnote 3 of the Estelle opinion thus links the bar to availability of federal habeas review to the involvement of counsel in the original failure to object. The distinction between
counseled and uncounseled defendants is clearer in Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion
in Wainwight v. Sykes. There, he noted that the Fay deliberate bypass test was never intended
to apply to all constitutional errors that occur during the trial process. Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 92 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring). He distinguished Sykes from Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (involving alleged waiver of right to counsel), and Fay because in
the latter cases only the defendant could make the decision to preserve the constitutional
claim. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 92 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring). The Chief
Justice did not say why only the defendant could make the Johnson/Fay-type decisions, but
the explanation appears to be practical: An appointed attorney's appointment ends with the
verdict or, if the client chooses to appeal, with noticing the appeal and obtaining permission
for the defendant to proceed in forma pauperis. The appellate court then appoints an attor-
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Under this view, counsel's failure to object or to make a motion
on a particular point will bind the defendant and bar habeas review
of the issue.5 ' Although other interpretations of the key footnote in
Estdle are possible, 2 this is the most plausible; it explains Chief Justice Burger's observation that, in a purportedly hopeless case like
Williams', counsel may try to elicit jury sympathy for his client by
ney (sometimes the trial attorney, sometimes a new attorney) for the appeal. Retained attorneys also usually contract only to represent the defendant through trial and notice of appeal.
As a result, no one but the defendant can decide to appeal or to ask for an attorney for trial or
appeal. See Bonds v. Wainwright, 564 F.2d 1125, 1133 n.3 (5th Cir. 1977) (Tjoflat, J.,
dissenting).
51. If counsel's objection could have prevented the error, the client will be barred from
collateral attack. See Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 157 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(failure to object to jury instruction bars collateral attack whether counsel's failure was deliberate or inadvertent).
Under this interpretation of Esellc, the Chief Justice has "answered" the questions, left
open by Fay and Hng, of who controls the defense case: Counsel can make every decision; if
counsel decides not to object or to make some motion, that decision bars all collateral relief in
the federal courts for the defendant, whether or not counsel consulted with the defendant.
See Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 158 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring). If carried to its
logical extreme, this interpretation of Estlle would work an even broader restriction on federal habeas review than the "cause and prejudice" test of Francirand Sykes, see Part II inra,by
eliminating the Fay deliberate bypass rule even where the failure to object violated no state
procedural rule.
52. There are at least two other interpretations of this footnote, each of which would
suggest a limitation on the availability of federal habeas relief. First, the Court may have
applied Fay and concluded that Williams had deliberately bypassed the opportunity to object
because he thought his case hopeless and purposefully wore jail clothes in a desperate attempt
to win jury sympathy. See 425 U.S. at 510 n.5 (discussing whether counsel could have made
a tactical choice, without so holding). But if this interpretation is correct, the Court not only
disagreed with both lower federal courts, but also either ignored or misinterpreted the record
from the state habeas hearing. The only evidence of the attorney's purpose in that record
was his testimony that he had not objected because he thought an objection futile. Petitioner's Appendix to the Supreme Court at 79. And rather than fearing his case was hopeless, the defendant stated that he thought he had acted in self-defense, id at 77-79, and that
he had chosen not to testify to avoid disclosing a 17-year old conviction, id at 79. Moreover,
the Court would have been underestimating the strength of the defense case, since the court
of appeals had not, after all, found harmless error. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
The self-defense evidence might have proved even stronger had not the attorney failed both
to cross-examine the state's witnesses vigorously, see note 34 supra, and to subpoena a defense
witness who would have supported the self-defense theory. (Estelle would not be the first case
in which the Court has been accused of misinterpreting the record to support its decision. See
Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observationson the Candorand Logic of the
Emerging Nion Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1199, 1201-09 (1971).
A second possible interpretation is that Estele is a sweeping redefinition of criminal procedural constitutional rights in general-making a defense objection an element of every
right. But this view is highly unlikely because, with the exception of certain elements of the
fourth amendment, see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (suspect need not be
informed that he can refuse consent search), and the fifth amendment, see United States v.
Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 186-90 (1977) (grand jury witness must invoke fifth amendment
protection), the Court has never required a lower court objection to trigger a constitutional
violation.
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deliberately allowing him to appear in jail clothes,5 3 and finds support in Justice Powell's assertion that even if a defendant suffers a
constitutional violation, there should be no habeas review where the
defendant had "consensually relinquished" the right in question or
had committed an "inexcusable procedural default" in failing to
54
object.
53. See 425 U.S. at 510 n.5. But see id. at 512 n.9 (conceding that "defense tactic" might
have really been "simple indifference"). This interpretation is also consistent with ChiefJustice Burger's citation in footnote 3 of On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), and
United States v. Indiviglio, 352 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 907 (1966), to
illustrate that post-conviction courts have refused to remedy errors when counsel has not
objected. In both On Lee and Indiviglio, counsel had objected to the introduction of certain
evidence but on a ground different from that urged on appeal. In On Lee, the Supreme Court
decided the merits of that ground because the court of appeals had done so, although the
Court indicated that the lower court could have denied review. 343 U.S. at 749 n.3. In
Indiviglio, the court of appeals refused to address the merits. 352 F.2d at 277. But because
On Lee and Indiviglio were direct appeal cases where the normal rule is that in the absence of
plain error the failure to object bars relief, see id at 280; FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b), the Chief
Justice's citation to those cases makes little sense unless the Court intends to eliminate the
distinction between direct and collateral relief. See United States v. O'Looney, 544 F.2d 385,
392 n.5 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1023 (1976) (on direct appeal Estelle cited in determining waiver).
54. 425 U.S. at 513-14 (Powell, J., concurring). The "consensual relinquishment" test
may simply restate the Fay bypass test, but the "inexcusable default" test, taken from Professor Hart, see Hart, Foreword-The Tine Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 118 (1959),
resurrects the forfeiture analysis explicitly rejected in Fay. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D.
SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 258 (2d ed. Supp. 1977) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]. Professor Hart
did not define what he meant by his test, but he felt it would help decide cases in state courts,
without resort to federal courts. See Hart, supra at 118. Estelle, Francis,and Sykes may fail to
achieve such a reduction. See note 212 infra and accompanying text; Part IV infra.
To support his position, Justice Powell also cited the ABA POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES
project, supra note 19, § 2.1 at 35-37. But that project concluded that collateral review of an
issue should be barred only where the defense had intentionally and inexcusably failed to
object. Id at 36. Justice Powell's citation of the project therefore implies that he either
misinterpreted the post-conviction hearing record, see note 52 supra, or conceived that a decision not to object could be intentional even if counsel does not appreciate the facts or law
underlying a possible objection. Without explaining why he could ignore Fay or what interests his limitation would achieve that Fay did not, but see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)
(Powell, J.); Schnecldoth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 256-75 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring),
Justice Powell argued that there was no need to apply the Johnson . Zerbst waiver test to any
but fundamental rights. Justice Powell would bar relief whenever counsel, aware of the law
and the facts, chose not to object. 425 U.S. at 515 (Powell, J., concurring). On the facts of
Estelle, this test means that if the attorney recognizes that he could object and decides for
whatever reason not to do so, relief is barred. The defendant need not participate in counsel's decision. Justice Powell did suggest that the habeas court might grant relief if "plain
error" resulted from counsel's decision, see id. at 514 n.2; since the "plain error" rule is peculiar to direct appeal, this suggestion implies that he, like Chief Justice Burger, is moving
toward eliminating the difference between direct and collateral review, see notes 53 supra; 135
infra.
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This interpretation of Estelle, if pushed to its limit, suggests that a
counseled defendant may be held to have made a "tactical" decision
that bars federal habeas review whenever counsel could have made
such a decision, regardless of whether the decision was ever in fact
made. 5- In all its obscurity, Estelle would thereby virtually eliminate
the Fay deliberate bypass test without ever mentioning it, 56 and,
without ever addressing the "cause and prejudice" test later developed by Francis and Sykes, would portend the very limitation on federal habeas review achieved by those cases.
B.

Francisv. Henderson

In a 1-day trial, a Louisiana jury convicted 17-year-old Abraham
Francis of felony murder for the death of one of his robbery accomNeither of Francis'
plices; he was sentenced to life imprisonment.
two defense attorneys had objected to the method of selecting the
55. See Mildwoff v. Cunningham, 432 F. Supp. 814, 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (citing Estelle)
(collateral relief barred in part because counsel could have made tactical decision, though no
evidence that he had); cf.United States v. O'Looney, 544 F.2d 385 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1023 (1976) (Estelle limits strict waiver scrutiny to fundamental rights, not strategic decisions); United States ex rel Hand v. Redman, 416 F. Supp. 1109, 1110 (D. Del. 1976) (Estelle
makes habeas review of state trial judge's failure to give unrequested jury instruction "inappropriate" where state court denied review and there was no denial of due process).
The Court has never indicated whether counsel could bind his client to a decision that
bars federal habeas relief when counsel overrides the client in a dispute over that decision.
But cf Taylor v. State, 291 Ala. 756, 760, 287 So. 2d 901, 905 (1973) (tactical trial decisions
are up to counsel; defendant must choose plea and type of defense).
56. The Fay bypass test might then apply only to the decision to ask for counsel, to
appeal, and, probably, to plead guilty. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644-45
(1976) (counsel cannot bind client to guilty plea without explaining all elements of offense to
which plea is made); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1966) (counsel cannot agree to a
bench trial that is in effect a guilty plea unless client consents); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. But
citation to Rule 11 in Estelle after his discusChief Justice Burger gave an unexplained "cf."
sion of counsel's power to bind the client to a "tactical" decision, 425 U.S. at 508 n.3. Was
the ChiefJustice hinting thereby that Estelle would not even prohibit a finding that collateral
relief was barred when counsel pleaded guilty for the defendant without the defendant's consent? See Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 158 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (Fay applicable only to "omissions of a technical nature which would be unlikely to jeopardize
substantial state interests") (emphasis added); Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 656-58
(1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (if motivated by tactical considerations in arranging guilty
plea, counsel need not consult client on all issues relevant to plea). But see ABA PROJE(T ON
STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE

FUNCTION § 5.2(a)(i) (App. Draft 1971).
The Estelle Court's careless treatment of the record and its confusing analysis of the law
make it difficult to assess the future force of that decision's implicit restrictions on federal
habeas relief. Yet lower courts have not ignored Estelle and have thought that its analysis
replaced the Fay deliberate bypass test whenever the right in question was "trial-type." See
cases cited in note 55 supra.
57. The facts about Francis and the circumstances of his trial are noted only by the
dissent. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 554 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Francis'
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grand jury that had indicted Francis,"8 even though, at the time of
the indictment, the local jury commission was systematically excluding daily wage-earners, of whom blacks formed a disproportionate
part.5 9 Francis took no direct appeal.' Several years after the verdict, Francis collaterally attacked his conviction in the state courts,
claiming, among other things, that the grand jury had been improperly selected.6 1
At the state habeas hearing, Francis testified that his attorneys
had not discussed with him the possibility of attacking the grand
jury's composition. 62 Francis' principal trial attorney did not testify
at this hearing because of illness.6 3 The associate trial counsel testified that before he took Francis' case, he had himself attacked that
jurisdiction's grand jury selection process in other cases and knew of
successful attacks by other lawyers in nearby districts.6 4 But the associate counsel admitted that he had not raised, with either the chief
counsel or the defendant, the possibility of challenging Francis' intwo alleged co-conspirators pleaded guilty and received 8-year sentences. Id Francis is still
in prison. Interview with appellate counsel (Mar. 28, 1978).
58. Francis' chief trial attorney, Tureaud, who was appointed but not compensated,
had been in failing health and had not practiced criminal law for several years before the
trial. 425 U.S. at 554 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He filed only four motions, three on the day
before the trial: a request for a bill of particulars, a motion to quash the indictment as vague
(Tureaud inserted Francis' name on a form motion supplied by the prosecutor, crossing out
the name of another defendant. Interview with appellate counsel (Mar. 28, 1978).) and a
motion to discover his client's confession, id During the trial the court denied Tureaud's
motion to suppress the confession. Id
Tureaud asked another lawyer, Amadee, to help at trial, but Amadee, though characterizing himself as a "trial expert," asked no questions at trial. Petitioner's Appendix in United
States Supreme Court at 27, 31. Amadee's role is left unclear by his testimony at the state
habeas hearing; he could not explain why Tureaud had not filed other motions or had not
filed earlier the motions that he did make, except to note that Tureaud had not handled
criminal matters for some years. Id at 31.
59. 425 U.S. at 555 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
60. Francis' attorneys convinced him to forego direct appeal in exchange for dismissal of
a pending robbery charge and because they "didn't want to be tied up for the rest of our lives
with a court-appointed [uncompensated] case." Petitioner's Appendix in United States
Supreme Court at 36 (testimony of Amadee). Amadee never determined whether the state
dropped the robbery charge. Id at 47.
Francis has apparently never argued that his attorneys' decision to forego appeal
amounted to constitutionally ineffective representation. Cf Bonds v. Wainwright, 564 F.2d
1125 (5th Cir. 1977) (attorney ineffective where he failed to appeal when defendant apparently let him make that decision).
61. Petitioner's Appendix in United States Supreme Court at 76-78.
62. Id at 61.
63. Id at 27.
64. Id at 26, 78.
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dictment,6 5 nor could he explain why the chief counsel had not raised
the claim. 66 The Louisiana habeas courts denied relief, enforcing
that state's procedural rule that barred appellate consideration, on
direct or collateral review, of any issue the defendant had failed to
raise before trial.6 7
In petitioning for federal habeas relief, Francis was confronted
with the possible application of Davis v. United States 68 to a state defendant like himself. Davis had denied access to federal habeas relief
to a federal defendant who had failed to meet the federal statutory
provision for timely challenge to an indictment6 9 -the same sort of
default that Francis had committed. The Court in Davis had asserted
that petitioners blocked by the federal procedural bar could gain access to federal habeas relief only if they could establish "cause" to
excuse their failure to make a timely claim and "actual prejudice"
resulting from that failure.7 °
In Francis, the federal district court did not think Davis controlled, and invoked the Fay deliberate bypass test rather than the
Davis test in considering Francis' petition.7 Interpreting Fa to require that the defendant alone can waive the opportunity to object,
65. Id at 31.
66. Amadee believed that Tureaud might have thought that challenging the grand and
petit juries would fail, since blacks were not wholly excluded from either. Id at 26. Though
never asked why he had not raised the grand jury issue, Amadee did testify that he had not
wanted to tell Tureaud, a noted civil rights attorney, what to do. Id at 26, 31.
67. Id at 76-79. At the time of Francis' trial, Louisiana law held that an objection to
the grand jury was waived if not made before the end of the third day after the grand jury's
term had expired or before trial, whichever occurred earlier. LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN.
art. 202 (West 1951) (current version at id art. 535 (B)(5) (West 1967)).
The state habeas court also found that Francis' two attorneys had not been ineffective
and also credited the associate counsel with having recognized that he could have challenged
the grand jury panel and yet having deliberately chosen not to do so. Petitioner's Appendix
in United States Supreme Court at 77, 78.
68. 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
69. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2), (f).
70. 411 U.S. at 242, 245. The federal statute provides that post-conviction attack is
"waived" unless the defendant establishes "cause" to excuse the failure to object. FED. R.
CRIM.P. 12(f). The Davis Court added "actual prejudice" as an independent test. 411 U.S.
at 245. In Shotwell Mfg. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 363 (1963), the Court had approved
of the district court's consideration of whether the defendant in that case had been
"prejudiced" as a factor in assessing "cause." Whether Sho/wel's "prejudice" was different
from Davis' "actual prejudice" was not explained in Davis, a question that Estelle, Francis,and
Sykes also fail to answer. On its face, Rule 12 does not indicate whether it should be applied
to collateral, as well as to direct attacks. Although Shotwell was a direct appeal, the Davis
Court thought that Rule 12 should also apply to collateral attacks by federal prisoners under
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). 411 U.S. at 240-43 (1973).
71. The district court thought that Davis had not eliminated federal habeas for a state
prisoner like Francis who had gone to trial, Francis v. Henderson, No. 72-719"G" (E.D. La.
Sept. 20, 1973), reprintedin Petitioner's Appendix in United States Supreme Court at 87, 91,
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the district court held that Francis had not committed a deliberate
bypass; 72 it further found that even if Davis controlled, Francis had
established "cause" by showing that his principal trial attorney was a
"civil lawyer, unskilled in the intricacies of criminal practice, who
had, by his inexperience," let the time to object pass. 73 The district
court thus reached the merits of the constitutional issue, found that
the grand jury had been unconstitutionally selected, and reversed
Francis' conviction.74
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that Davis established
the test for state prisoners and remanded to the district court to determine whether Francis could prove he had been prejudiced by the
failure to object. 75 The court of appeals neither disturbed nor discussed the district court's finding of "cause."
In a cursory opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the remand,7 6
and placed the state's procedural rule in the way of federal habeas
review. The Court explained that the issue was not whether the
habeas court had the power to exercise jurisdiction but whether, in
its equitable discretion, it should exercise that power. Comity and
federalism, the Francis Court concluded, required that the same principles that governed the availability of habeas relief to the federal
defendant in Davis must apply to a state defendant like Francis.77 Applying these principles, the Court followed its earlier holding in Davis
that the government's interest in finality outweighs the defendant's
interest in review of the issue.78 In order to justify a grant of federal
and that Francis' questionable waiver of his right to directly appeal his conviction did not bar
federal habeas review, Petitioner's Appendix in United States Supreme Court at 90.
72. Petitioner's Appendix in United States Supreme Court at 89, 90.
73. Sea Newman v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 896, 897-98 (5th Cir. 1974). The district court
did not find that either Tureaud's or Amadee's representation was constitutionally ineffective
under the sixth amendment, although their perfunctory representation smacked of ineffectiveness. Petitioner's Appendix in United States Supreme Court at 78.
74. Set Newman v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 896, 897-99 (5th Cir. 1974).
75. Id at 897-98. The district court had not discussed the issue of prejudice.
76. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
77. The Court did not discuss whether Congress intended through enactment of Rule
12, the federal procedural bar, to treat federal defendants differently from state defendants.
For a blistering criticism of this omission in Francis,see HART & WECHSLER, supira note 54, at
256-57.
78. Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 242 (1973); see Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S.
536, 542 (1976) (quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 228 (1969)). The Davis
Court thought that any defendant had a strong tactical motive to delay his objection to the
grand jury until habeas review. It reasoned that the defendant would not profit from a
successful objection made in compliance with the procedural rule: The government would
simply reindict him with a properly selected grand jury. But raising the claim much later on
habeas review might free a convicted defendant, since the prosecution might find it practi-
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habeas relief, the state defendant, like the federal defendant in Davis,
must establish "cause" for the failure to comply with the state's procedural rule and "actual prejudice" suffered as a result of the
failure."9
The decision in Francis left several questions unanswered. The
Court neither reconciled its decision with the earlier decisions in Fay
and Henry nor even mentioned the deliberate bypass test. The Court
thus did not discuss whether a defense decision not to object until
habeas review would constitute a deliberate bypass within the meaning of Fay or whether the federal habeas court would have difficulty
in ascertaining whether the defense had made that type of decision.
Nor did the Court discuss whether counsel's incompetency might instead explain why he or she had not objected. Moreover, in applying the new "cause and prejudice" test, the Court did not explain
whether these requirements applied to constitutional issues other
than an attack on the institution of the criminal proceedings.80 Nor
did the Court discuss whether the district court's finding of "cause"
was correct. Finally, although it suggested that proving "actual
prejudice" required more than just a showing of a constitutional violation,8 1 Francis failed to give any definitive content to the "actual
prejudice" test. Wainwright v. Sykes, though it also fails to provide
clear guidance on the meaning of "cause and prejudice," more firmly
establishes that test as the new law on federal habeas, and therefore
cally impossible to reconstruct its case. Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 241 (1973).
And, as the Francis Court noted, the government, years after the original indictment, might
not easily find the evidence necessary to rebut a prima facie showing by the defendant that
the grand jury had been improperly selected. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 541-42
(1976) (citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 98 n.5 (1955)); see note 252 infra.
79. 425 U.S. at 542. The Court did not explain how Francis might establish actual
prejudice, a task that would probably prove impossible. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 504
(1972) (proof of harm impossible to adduce when jurors are excluded on basis of race). On
remand to the federal district court, the state moved for summary judgment, arguing that
Francis could never prove actual prejudice, and also moved to quash the defense attempt to
discover any information about the grand jury's proceedings in Francis' case. Interview with
appellate counsel (Mar. 26, 1978); see note 153 infra.
80. The Davis Court had expressly limited its holding to "claims of defects in the institution of criminal proceedings," as Rule 12(b)(2) provided at the time of that decision. Davis
v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 241 (1973).
81. The Court did not challenge the district court's holding that the grand jury selection
was in fact unconstitutional. See 425 U.S. 538 n.2. Francisis distinguished from Davis by this
factor, as well as by the fact that Davis' counsel, far from being arguably ineffective like
Francis', had been complimented on his performance by the court of appeals, Davis v. United
States, 409 F.2d 1095, 1101 (5th Cir. 1969), and by the relative weakness of Davis' claim of
grand jury prejudice: The grand jury that had indicted him had also indicted two white
accomplices. See Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 235 (1973).
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provides the best opportunity for a close analysis of the Court's new
work.
C.

Wainwright v. Sykes

A jury convicted John Sykes of third-degree murder. At the trial,
defense counsel did not object when the prosecution introduced the
defendant's statements to the police in which he confessed to the killing.82 On direct and collateral review, the Florida state courts denied Sykes' attack on his conviction without opinion, apparently by
enforcing a state contemporaneous objection rule which held that
83
failure to object constituted a waiver of that objection.
In his habeas petition to the federal district court, Sykes claimed
that he had been drunk when he encountered the police and therefore had not intelligently waived his Miranda rights.8 4 The district
court interpreted the Supreme Court decision injackson v. Denno85 as
requiring the state trial court to determine-on its motion, if the defendant fails to object-whether the defendant's statements were
constitutionally admissible.86 In remanding to the state courts to
make that determination, the district court took no evidence on why
the defense attorney had not objected or on whether the defendant
had agreed that counsel should not have objected.8 7
82. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 75 (1977).
83. Interview with appellate counsel (Mar. 15, 1978).
84. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 528 F.2d 522, 523 (5th Cir. 1976). The district court
opinion, No. 73-316-Civ.-T-H (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 1975) is unreported. The record in the
Supreme Court did not clearly indicate what statements the government had introduced at
trial or what warnings the police had given Sykes. At both the scene of the crime and the
police station, Sykes had apparently admitted shooting the victim. The Court characterized
the on-the-scene statement as voluntary, 433 U.S. at 74, but the trial transcript left in doubt
whether Sykes had been given the Miranda warnings at the scene before the first statements
were made. 528 F.2d at 524 n.4. The federal district court noted that a government witness
testified that somebody had given Sykes his "constitutional rights" at the scene, but did not
remember who had done that, what those "rights" were, or whether Sykes had appeared to
understand them. Petitioner's Appendix in United States Supreme Court at A-28, A-29. The
district court also noted that two sheriffs deputies had testified that they had read Sykes his
"rights" at the jail, but did not testify to what "rights" they had read, or to whether Sykes
had understood them. Id at A-29.
85. 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (trial court must itself decide admissibility of confession before
jury can hear it).
86. See 528 F.2d at 524.
87. Petitioner's Appendix in United States Supreme Court at A-31. The district court
thought that the state had not carried its burden ofjustifying the admission of the statements,
and remanded to give the state courts the opportunity to develop additional information. If
the state court failed to act within 90 days, the district court was prepared to proceed and
apparently to rule for the defendant. The state appealed that remand order. Id at A-29.
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the remand. 88
Though nothing on the record showed why counsel had not objected,
or whether the defendant knew of and agreed with counsel's reasons
for not objecting, or what prejudice the failure to object might have
caused, the court of appeals held that a remand was necessary under
either the Fay bypass test or the Davis cause and prejudice test: 9 It
found both an absence of deliberate bypass and the existence of
"cause," because it refused to infer a waiver-even by counsel-from
a silent record, and it could divine no tactical advantage that counsel
might have hoped to achieve by deciding not to object.' In contrast
to its decision in Francis,9 ' where it had expected the defendant to
prove the prejudice caused by the unconstitutionally selected grand
jury, the Fifth Circuit in Sykes found "actual prejudice" by concluding that the government's use of the defendant's statement was inherently harmful.

92

The Supreme Court reversed the remand and ordered that the
petition be dismissed.9" Without renouncing the Court's power to
exercise habeas review,9 4 the Court acknowledged, as it had not done
in Francis, that it intended to replace the Fay deliberate bypass test
with the cause and actual prejudice test whenever the defendant
failed to comply with the state's procedural rule governing the timing of objections. 95 This acknowledgement made reversal inevitable,
since the defendant had not attempted to meet the burden of either
part of the new test: He had not shown why the attorney had not
88. Wainwright v. Sykes, 528 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1976).
89. The court of appeals noted the conflict between Fayf/engy and Davi" but did not
resolve which doctrine controlled. See id at 525-27.
90. Id at 525-27. The appeals court thought that the state had the burden of showing
deliberate bypass.
91. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
92. 528 F.2d at 525-27. The court of appeals did not discuss how the government's use
of the statement had specifically harmed the defendant or whether the error, if any, was
harmless.
93. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977).
94. Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist reviewed earlier Supreme Court decisions
to illustrate how the Court has changed the scope of habeas review even though congressional
authorization of habeas jurisdiction did not change. Id. at 81.
95. Id. at 87-88. Justice Rehnquist did not discuss whether deliberate bypass could have
been made workable by clearly assigning the burden of proof and by providing the petitioner
with a way to develop relevant information on that issue, both problems that plagued habeas
review after Fay/Henry. Nor did he consider whether the problems of developing the record
could have been reduced, if not eliminated, if the trial court were required to ask counsel why
he did not make some obviously pertinent motion or request. Counsel's answer would provide a record to evaluate deliberate bypass and to test counsel's effectiveness. As Estelle indicates, however, the Court has no intention of forcing the trial court to intercede in the defense
case. 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976); see notes 274-75 infra and accompanying text.
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objected, and he was not entitled to a presumption of harm. Perhaps because it thought the government's case against Sykes so
strong as to rebut any possible claim of prejudice,9 6 the Court did
not, as it had done in Francis,97 remand to the lower court to permit
the defendant to develop the evidence he needed to meet the cause
and prejudice test.9 " Yet despite the firmness with which the Skes
Court pronounced the advent of the cause and prejudice test, it left
the meaning of that test vexingly enigmatic.9 9 The next part of the
article attempts to unravel that enigma.
II.

DEFINING THE "CAUSE AND PREJUDICE" RULE: THE

REMAINING AVENUES FOR A HABEAS PETITIONER

The present Court has virtually rejected the Fay Court's willingness to provide habeas review.l°° The defendant will be barred if he
96. 433 U.S. at 91. This surmise is surprising, since the state appeared to concede during oral argument before the Court that Sykes had been prejudiced. Transcript of Oral

Argument at 10-iI (Mar. 29, 1977).
97. See note 75 s-upra and accompanying text.
98. The Court's refusal to remand was unfair, because, without testimony or an affidavit from trial counsel, the defendant could not determine why counsel had not objected, or
what prejudice he might have suffered. Moreover, because Fay and Henry left unanswered the
question of which side carried the burden of production or persuasion, see notes 180-87 injfa
and accompanying text, the defendant might decide not to approach trial counsel to get an
affidavit to submit with his habeas petition. But Sykes' federal appellate counsel did not
make that decision. Ironically, he apparently chose not to ask trial counsel why the latter
had not objected so that he could avoid the deliberate bypass question if asked by the federal
habeas courts. Interview with appellate counsel (Mar. 15, 1978). Trial counsel does not now
remember why he did not object. He now recognizes that he could have objected, but believes
that he saw no reason to object because he had not thought the government's use of Sykes'
statements was inconsistent with the defense case. Interview with trial counsel (Mar. 29,
1977).
99. The Court only explained that "[w]e leave open for resolution in future decisions
the precise definition of the 'cause'-and-'prejudice' standard, and note here only that it is
narrower than the standard set forth in dicta in Fay v. Noa.. .. It is the sweeping language
of Fay.

. .

which we today reject." 433 U.S. at 87.

100. Whatever uncertainty the Court has caused for the future of habeas corpus, two
points are clear. First, habeas relief is equitable and discretionary in nature. Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 95-96 & n.4 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring); se Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 478 n. 11 (1976); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 538-39 (1976). The habeas court is
free to decide on the totality of the circumstances whether to grant relief. See United States
v. Williams, 544 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1976) (habeas court has discretion to decide whether to
grant relief for noncompliance with FED. R. CRIM. P. 12). Second, habeas relief is reserved
only for the most deserving defendants. Since the purpose of habeas review is no longer to
provide a federal forum to review constitutional issues not adjudicated below, or to ensure the
equal enforcement of federal constitutional rights, the focus will be on whether the individual
petitioner deserves relief for the most exigent reasons. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at
91 (cause and prejudice do not bar relief to prevent a "miscarriage ofjustice'); United States
v. Williams, 544 F.2d at 1218 (relief under Rule 12 viewed as exercise of "extraordinary
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or she waives or forfeits the right to challenge the government's conduct.' 0 ' The defendant waives even under Fay by personally making
power that must be regarded as an exception to the rule"); cf.White, FederalHabeas Corpus:
The Impact of the FailuretoAssert a ConstitutionalRight at Trial, 58 VA. L. REV. 67, 81-82 (1972)
(where counsel has deliberately bypassed opportunity to object, habeas relief should be available only if collateral attack would "benefit society").
The Court has not squarely considered whether it is authorized by the Constitution or by
Congress to alter the law of federal habeas corpus. While acknowledging that federal habeas
jurisdiction is a creature of congressional authorization, see Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372
(1977), the Court has cut back its exercise of habeas jurisdiction even though Congress has not
clearly intended that that be done. In Davis, for example, the Court cited no legislative history in concluding that Congress must have intended that Rule 12's "cause shown" requirement bar habeas review as well as direct review of an issue counsel did not raise at trial. And
if Davis lacked a clear congressional imprimatur, Francis had none whatsoever, a lack that
perhaps explains why the Court used an analysis bottomed on comity rather than on congressional intent. The Court has also ignored the question whether Congress' refusal to restrict
federal habeas is an implicit confirmation of broader habeas review than Francis/Sykes provide. See note 24 supra. Conversely, one wonders whether the Court would exercise its equitable discretion to refuse to follow new legislation that overturned the Francis/Sykes/Stone v.
Powell restrictions on habeas review. See S. 1314, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (proposed
legislation to overturn Francisand Stone). Three Justices even think that congressional elimination of federal habeas review would be constitutional. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. at
385-86 (Burger, C.J., concurring with whom Blackmun and Rehnquist, J.J., join).
The waiver test will remain the Fay analysis of whether the defendant himself made an
informed, voluntary decision. The forfeiture test will involve a comparison of the defendant's interests in gaining review with the state's interests in barring review. In the future,
federal habeas courts will probably use this comparative analysis to decide whether to apply
the Fay test or the Estelle/Francis/Sykestest to the issue raised by petitioner. See Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 508 n.1 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting) (comparison of cost to benefit
might eliminate grand jury discrimination questions from federal habeas altogether).
The counseled defendant, however, can waive but probably cannot forfeit an issue that
would eliminate the state court's jurisdiction even if he fails to object and even if he pleads
guilty. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (per curiam) (pleading guilty to
unlawfully possessing unregistered firearm does not constitute waiver of prior constitutional
claim of privilege against self-incrimination); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (where
defendant obtains trial de novo on misdemeanor by exercising an automatic right of appeal,
government may not proceed instead to prosecute defendant for a felony based on same conduct) (habeas not waived by guilty plea to felony); cf Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333
(1974) (collateral attack available where circuit court voids statute under which defendant
convicted while direct appeal pending); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968) (claim
that statute defining crime is unconstitutional not waived by counseled guilty pleas). But see
Commonwealth v. McKenna, 46 U.S.L.W. 2424 (Pa. Feb.21, 1978) (because of society's concern with capital punishment, defendant who prefers death to imprisonment cannot waive
constitutional attack on death penalty).
101. See note 33 supra and accompanying text. The absence of a procedural rule should
make a difference, justifying federal habeas relief even without proof of cause and prejudice,
since such a rule would alert counsel to the importance of objecting. Cf Murch v. Mottram,
409 U.S. 41, 46 (1972) (defendant may not evade state procedural rules by claiming he did
not intend to waive constitutional claim).
The question of Estelle's direct application to federal habeas review must be answered for
any federal court that seeks to limit the application of Francisand Sykes by interpreting those
cases as not barring habeas relief where counsel's failure to object violated no state procedural
rule or by distinguishing the particular state procedural rules in those cases from another rule

November 1978]

FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS

an intelligent and voluntary decision not to object. If counsel fails to
object and the defendant cannot prove "cause" and "actual
prejudice" to excuse counsel's failure, the defendant forfeits whenever the state has a rule governing the timing of objections, and per0 2
haps, as suggested by Estelle, even when the state does not.'
In establishing this test, however, the Court deliberately avoided
giving "precise content"'' 0 3 to "cause" and "actual prejudice." This
before it. See Bromwell v. Williams, 445 F. Supp. 106, 112-14 (D. Md. 1977) (state procedural bar enforced in state courts to bar review of defense claim differs from that in S kes and
Francis because it is not "specifically and solely keyed to trial developments"; court does not
explain significance of difference but reaches merits of claim). Bromwdl's distinction is meaningless if Estelle limits habeas review. But see cases cited in note 55 supra. But the question of
Estelle's application to habeas cannot yet be answered: The Court's opinion in Estelle is too
ambiguous, not even mentioning habeas corpus, Francis did not refer to Estelle, and Sykes
cited the majority opinion in Estelle only for the point that the attorney controls every tactical
decision. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 n.14 (1977). Several factors suggest, however,
that Estelle does apply to habeas. Chief Justice Burger, for example, has cited Estelle in
arguing that federal habeas should have been barred when the defendant had not complied
with a state procedural rule. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 158 (1977) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring). S)ykes described Justice Powell's Estele test of "inexcusable procedural default,"
see note 54 supra and accompanying text, as designed to achieve the same values that
prompted creation of the cause and prejudice tests. 433 U.S. at 89 n.13. Several of the
reasons given by the Sykes Court to restrict federal habeas review, see notes 197-211 infta and
accompanying text, apply equally where no procedural rule exists: determining all issues at
trial when witnesses' memories are fresh and the trial judge can remedy error, developing a
record for the habeas court, and ending litigation.
102. Denying habeas review of claims unraised at trial even in states that have no procedural bar rule may find additional support in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), which
barred habeas review of fourth amendment issues whenever the state had provided the defendant with "an opportunity for full and fair litigation" of that issue---even if the state court
did not decide the merits. Id at 494. Commentators have focused on what a "full and fair
hearing" might be. See Tushnet, Judicial Revision of the Habeas Corpus Sa/u/es: A Noe on
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 484, 495-96 (responding to the appearance of
the phrase in an earlier case); Note, Stone v. Powell: The End ofCollateralReview for FourthAmendment Claimsby State Prisoners?, 13 CAL. W. L. REV. 558, 583-86 (1977). But the key word may
be "opportunity." That term of art suggests that federal habeas review may disappear when
the defense does not object---even in the absence of a state contemporaneous objection
rule--so long as the state provides trial and appellate review of claims which are timely
raised. In Sykes, because the state had not argued the point, the Court did not decide
whether Stone would bar federal habeas review of petitioner's fifth amendment claim. 433
U.S. at 87 n.l 1. Since the state courts had not addressed the merits of the fifth amendment
claim, Sykes may have been reserving the possibility of such a reading of Stone. This extension of Stone is supported by the federal abstention doctrine: A federal court may not intervene to block a state proceeding if the individual had "an opportunity to present [his or her]
federal claims in the state proceedings," even if the state courts neither held "an actual hearing" nor decided the claim. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977) (emphasis in original).
103. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,91 (1977). However much the Sykes tests will
restrict federal habeas jurisdiction, they will not return that jurisdiction to its bounds under
Daniels v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (reported with Brown v. Allen). In Daniels the state
courts denied appellate review because the defendant filed his notice of appeal one day late.
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failure is cavalier, if not incomprehensible, if one of the Court's purposes in limiting federal habeas is to make it easier for the lower federal courts to deny review instead of reaching the merits of the issue
counsel failed to raise. Without clear direction from the Court, federal habeas courts will find it no easier to decide what "cause" and
"actual prejudice" mean than to settle the jumble of issues Fay and
Henty left unanswered concerning the meaning of deliberate bypass.
Understandably, some federal district courts have responded to
Estelle, Franc's, and Sykes by deciding the merits of the issue even
after deciding that they lack jurisdiction to do so, apparently to prevent a remand if a higher court
disagrees with their application of
10 4
the new Supreme Court test.
This part attempts to give more precise content to "cause and
prejudice." It suggests the criteria by which future courts will apply
the cause and prejudice test, and examines the defendant's likely burden of proof on these questions, a burden the Court never clearly
delineated.
A.

Cause

In attempting to discern the content of the "cause" test, the most
reliable guide"0 5 may well be the facts of Estele and Sykes.' °6 In
The Supreme Court refused habeas review, respecting the state's procedural bar, because the
petitioner had not shown that his late filing was caused by "lack of counsel, incapacity, or
some interference by officials." Id at 485-86.
104. See, e.g., Richardson v. Stone, 421 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1976). Lower courts
frequently approached the issue of deliberate bypass in the same way: Rather than decide
that issue, they denied the petition on the merits. See ABA POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES,
supra note 19, § 2.1, at 36.
105. There are three other potential sources: (1) the judicial interpretation of the "cause
shown" requirement of FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(f); (2) the judicial treatment of deliberate bypass; and (3) the judicial doctrine of constitutionally ineffective representation. Neither of
the latter two sources are helpful because of the great disagreement about the type of attorney
conduct encompassed by the two doctrines. On deliberate bypass, see notes 11-12 supra and
accompanying text. But see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 98 (1977) (White, J., concurring) (defining cause in terms of absence of deliberate bypass). For the ineffective representation doctrine, see notes 297-307 infta and accompanying text. Judicial interpretation of Rule
12(f) provides some useful examples, but these cases do not necessarily give content to the
new "cause" test, because the federal courts consider a determination of "cause shown" to be
part of their inherent power, independent of the rule, to "do justice" in a particular case. See
United States v. Jones, 322 F. Supp. 1110, 1112 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (treating former Rule 12(b)).
See also United States v. Rosenson, 291 F. Supp. 867, 872 (E.D. La. 1968) (reasonableness in
Rule 12 is factual question "sprinkled with a measure of discretion"), a'dper cuiam, 417 F.2d
629 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 962 (1970). Professor Moore's suggestion that determination of "cause shown" is really a determination of "plain error" indicates that Rule 12
cases may also not be congruent with Francis/Sykes "cause" because "plain error" may not be
enough to satisfy even "actual prejudice" under Francis and Sykes. See 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRAcTIcE
12.03 [3], at 12-22 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as MOORE]; note 135 infra and
accompanying text.
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Estelle, the attorney recognized the issue involving the jail clothes,
but did not know either the law or the facts relevant to that issue.
He decided not to object simply because he thought, erroneously,
that the motion would be denied and not because he hoped either to
achieve some tactical advantage or to avoid some potential damage
to his client's case.' °7 In Sykes, although nothing in the record explains why the attorney did not object,'0 8 even a successful motion
might not have helped his client, because the government could have
used the statement to impeach the defendant when he testified.' 0 9
If Estelle and Sykes illustrate the defendant's burden, few defendants will be able to establish cause. If the attorney exercises professional judgment," 0 perhaps simply if the attorney consciously
Courts thus treat Rule 12(f) "cause shown" as involving a fluid and fluctuating relationship between counsel's reasons for not making a timely objection, the merits of the objection,
the prejudice that the defendant would suffer if the claim underlying the objection were not
decided, and the question whether counsel at least made an objection after the time provided
by the rule. See Wells v. Wainwright, 488 F.2d 522, 523 (5th Cir. 1973); Partida v. Castaneda, 384 F. Supp. 79, 84 (S.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd, 524 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1976), aj'd, 430
U.S. 482 (1977). The Supreme Court's approach to "cause" in Francis and Skes appears
instead to focus solely on counsel's conduct, considering the other factors as part of the
"prejudice" test. See notes 130-79 inlra and accompanying text.
106. Unfortunately, the Francis Court did not discuss the district court's finding of
cause. That discussion might have illuminated the relationship between Francis' "cause,"
FED. R. CRIM. P. 12's "cause," and ineffective representation. The district court's finding of
Rule 12 cause was probably wrong because the trial attorney apparently knew of the motion
to quash the indictment and surely could have discovered the factual basis for the motion
since other attorneys had apparently challenged the same grand jury selection process that
led to the indictment of Francis. See note 64 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, in
apparently finding counsel ineffective the district court focused on counsel's overall performance rather than upon his failure to object to the grand jury, a focus that may also be wrong.
See notes 192 & 299 injfa.
107. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
108. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
109. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 96-97 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in SyPkes is the most perplexing road sign to the Court's eventual definition of cause and prejudice. He argued that those tests were consistent with the way
federal courts had interpreted deliberate bypass. Id at 94-95 & n.1. But his illustrations
weaken his argument, because the cases differ in determining whether counsel had made a
decision and what sort of decision counsel had had to make. See, e.g., Minor v. Black, 527
F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1975) (court does not speculate about counsel's failure to object); Whitney v.
United States, 513 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1974) (court speculates about counsel's failure to object
and concludes that he made deliberate decision); United States ex re. Cruz v. LaVallee, 448
F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972) (court speculates that counsel's use of
confession is consistent with trial strategy).
110. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 98-99 (1977) (White, J., concurring). This
definition of cause is consistent with the refusal to review the reasonableness of tactical judgments by counsel as a basis for ineffective representation. See Whitney v. United States, 513
F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1974).
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decides not to object,'' the defendant will be barred from habeas
relief. It is not enough for the defendant to show that counsel failed
to research or to understand the law, 1 2 or objected on the wrong
ground,' 1 3 or failed to get a ruling on the objection from the trial
court," 4 or failed to discover the information upon which the objection was based in time to comply with the procedural rule." 5 It is
not enough for the defendant to show that counsel wrongly decided
that the motion would be denied," 6 or that counsel was not motivated by either the hope of gaining some tactical advantage or of
avoiding some possible harm,' 17 or that the defendant disagreed with
counsel's decision." 8 And there is no suggestion in Estelle, Francis, or
Sykes that the habeas court must review the reasonableness of the
attorney's decision." 9 Finally, it is not enough to show that counsel
did not know of the information that would have supported an objection, at least if this information was reasonably discoverable.' 20
111. If FED. R. CRIM. P. 12 provides the definition of cause, it may not even be enough
to show that counsel did not decide against objecting, if he could have discovered the information to warrant that objection. See Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341,
362-63 (1963); Scales v. United States, 260 F.2d 21, 46 (4th Cir. 1958), ard,367 U.S. 203, 259
(1961).
112. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); cf United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,
102 n.5 (1976) (counsel's ignorance of law not ineffective representation).
113. This limitation assumes that Estelle eliminated the difference between direct and
collateral attack. See note 53 supra; cf United States v. Radetsky, 535 F.2d 556, 571 (10th Cir.
1976) (defense barred from introducing evidence of discriminatory prosecution during trial
because that objection should have been presented as motion to dismiss indictment rather
than as affirmative defense; no explanation why counsel proceeded as he did). Butcf.Allen v.
County Court, 568 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1977) (habeas not barred where petitioner objected at
trial and on appeal on substantially same ground as urged on collateral attack).
114. Cf Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 839-40 & n.8 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (objection at trial on ground other than one raised in habeas petition).
115. See Scales v. United States, 260 F.2d 21, 46 (4th Cir. 1958) (defense objected but
not within Rule 12's time provisions; objection waived because "information on which motion was based was at all times available"), aJ'd,367 U.S. 203 (1961).
116. See United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (habeas barred
where counsel's decision not to object appears sound and reasonable in retrospect, even if
incorrect).
117. Cf id at 353-54 n.7 (unclear why counsel failed to object except perhaps to avoid
irritating judge).
118. See Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1965) (counsel's deliberate bypass
bars defendant who wanted counsel to object); cf United States ex reZ Brown v. Warden, 417
F. Supp. 970 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (counsel's deliberate bypass of appeal issue binds defendant even
if done without defendant's knowledge and consent).
119. If the petitioner frames his habeas petition as an attack on counsel's competency
for having failed to object, the habeas court probably must review the reasonableness of the
counsel's decision. See Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73, 82 (9th Cir. 1965) (reviewing merits
of objection counsel deliberately bypassed). See also Part IV in/ra.
120. Counsel is apparently held to constructive notice of that information. See Davis v.
United States, 411 U.S. 233, 235 (1973) (collateral review barred where method of selecting
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There are, however, several ways the defendant might establish
cause. First, if counsel did object, albeit out-of-time, the defendant
could show that counsel's failure to strictly comply with the procedural rule was inadvertent and not deliberate.' 2 1 Second, the defendant could show that the attorney did not actually decide to refrain
from objecting:122 Counsel might have lacked the competence to
recognize the issue; 123 the practice challenged on post-conviction appeal may have been so customary in the jurisdiction that a reasonable trial attorney might not have objected; 24 the government may
have failed to reveal information that would have alerted counsel to
grand jurors had been "openly followed for many years prior to petitioner's indictment");
Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 363 (1963) (no cause under FED. R. CRIM.
P. 12 where grand jury selection process used for years); cf Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501
(1976) (counsel could have determined that trial judge would have granted objection to jail
clothes). See also Wells v. Wainwright, 488 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1973) (remanding to determine
whether counsel could reasonably have discovered information but not clearly indicating
whether such finding would bar collateral attack).
121. See United States v. Hall, 565 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1978) (interpreting FED. R. GRIM.
P. 12(f)); United States v. Jones, 322 F. Supp. 1110, 1112 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (late objection
caused by "bureaucratic bungling"; government had time to prepare a response).
If the trial court did not appoint counsel until after the time for filing objections had
passed, or if the court could cure any error even if counsel's objection was late or did not
comply with the technical requirements of the state's procedural requirements, the federal
habeas court should have no reasonable interest in enforcing the state's procedural bar. See
Huffman v. Florida, 98 S. Ct. 1888 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari);
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 56 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965). Additionally, cause might exist if the state court itself interfered
with counsel's decision. Cf. White v. Estelle, 566 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1978) (court forced counsel to proceed to trial on case for which he had not been retained).
122. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 99 (1977) (White, J., concurring). See also
Reitz, FederalHabeas Corpa:Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1315, 1367
(1961).
123. The relationship between ineffective representation and cause is unsettled and
presents a difficult question for the Supreme Court to resolve to protect its purpose in restricting habeas review. See Part IV infra. Counsel has been held ineffective for having failed to
comply with procedural rules that might bar habeas review under Estel/e, Francis, and Skes.
See Johns v. Perini, 462 F.2d 1308 (6th Cir. 1972) (failure to investigate alibi defense led to
failure to comply with alibi notice statute); People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34
Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963) (counsel ineffective where failure to object to admission of evidence
resulted from ignorance of law). But while proof of ineffective representation should establish cause, it should not be required for a showing of cause. Cause should also be inferred from
reasons for a failure to object other than counsel's sloth or ignorance. See notes 124-29 infra
and accompanying text.
124. See Bromwell v. Williams, 445 F. Supp. 106 (D. Md. 1977) (cause established
where neither defense, prosecutor, nor judge recognized that jurisdiction's usual practice of
arguing consolidation motions before jury panel presented due process problems). But cf.
Arnold v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 964, 971-72 (5th Cir..1975) (no cause even if crucial facts are
discovered inadvertently, and other local defense lawyers had also failed to ferret out relevant
facts to attack grand jury selection process).
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the issue; 125 or the legal basis for the objection may have been discovered or even created only after the time for objection had passed but
before the conviction became final. 126 Third, the defendant might
show cause if the attorney decided not to object because objecting
might have had "grisly" results for the defendant, 127 or because counsel reasonably feared that the trial court or jury might retaliate
against the defendant in response to the objection.128 Finally, the
defendant might also show that no attorney would ever have made a
tactical decision to refrain from objecting-that any attorney who
had recognized the possibility of an objection would have made
29
one.'
B.

Actual Preiudice

A constitutional violation is not in itself proof of actual
prejudice;1 30 the defendant must show concrete harm. The habeas
125. Compare United States v. Costello, 221 F.2d 668, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1955) (failure to
object until trial that grand jury's indictment based on hearsay excused where defense could
not have discovered that information in time to comply with FED. R. CRIM. P. 12), a fdon
othergrounds,350 U.S. 359 (1956), with United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir.
1973) (motion to suppress untimely under Rule 12 because no reason to believe discovery
inadequate to alert defense to government's intended use of evidence). See a/so Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (government's failure to disclose co-defendant's confession violates due process).
126. Cf. O'Connor v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 92 (1966) (per curiam) (prospective application of
new constitutional command applies to defendant on direct appeal). See also Doby v. Beto,
371 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Rosenson, 291 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. La. 1968),
aj'dpercuriam, 417 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 962 (1970). In contrast,
there may be no cause if the factual information, rather than the legal support, was discovered or created only after the defendant's conviction if counsel could reasonably have discovered that information earlier. See note 123 supra.
127. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 440 (1963) (defendant feared to press state court appeal
because at retrial he might be sentenced to death). But cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S.
357 (1978) (threat of recidivist sentence not enough to overturn guilty plea to lesser charge).
128. See Whitus v. Balkcom, 333 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1964) (no deliberate bypass where
counsel feared that attack on racial composition of all-white petit jury would inflame jury); cf.
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 511 (1976) (no evidence that counsel "feared any adverse
consequences attending an objection" to jail clothes).
129. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 361 (1977) (no waiver when "no basis for
presuming . . . that counsel could possibly have made a tactical decision not to examine"
presentence report in capital case, citing Estele); Jiminez v. Estelle, 557 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.
1977) (cause established if counsel knew facts warranting objection to court's unconstitutional
use of prior conviction where failure to object could not be tactically based); Bromwell v.
Williams, 445 F. Supp. 106 (D. Md. 1977)(characterizing failure to object to argument on
consolidation motion before petit jury as one that could not involve tactical judgment, and
contrasting that situation to Estelle where attorney could have made tactical decision concerning client's appearance in jail clothes). In effect Bromwel/is andJimnez'sconclusions are
a finding of counsel's incompetency for not having objected. They also mark a return to the
willingness of courts to infer what counsel intended when no record of his actual intent exists.
130. In Francis, for example, the district court found that the grand jury selection proc-
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court will not presume harm even if the defendant has understandable difficulty in finding the evidence to establish prejudice, 13 1 or if

the government could have prevented the occurrence of the constitutional violation by policing itself, or if the trial court itself committed
the violation.' 3 2 Beyond this minimum, the Court has left no clear
clue about the meaning of actual prejudice. But several sources help
reveal the type of petitioner for whom the Court intends to reserve
relief.
First, a petitioner will not win relief by establishing only that if
defense counsel had objected, either the defense trial strategy13 3 or
the evidence presented to the jury would have changed. The Court
has already rejected those possibilities as grounds for relief in connection with a motion for new trial under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, 134 a motion that presents a more compelling
ess was unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision to
remand the case to decide whether the defendant had been prejudiced by the violation.
Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976).
131. See United States v. Williams, 544 F.2d 1215, 1218 (4th Cir. 1976) (defendant not
entitled to presumption of harm from failure of court to inform him of statute requiring
appointment of two attorneys in capital case upon request). But see Bromwell v. Williams,
445 F. Supp. 106, 114 (D. Md. 1977) (prejudice found, apparently without proof by petitioner, because "it is quite possible that [the failure to object to argument on motion to consolidate made before petit jury panel] . . . would have contributed to Bromwell's
conviction"). Bromwel/ is probably wrong if petitioner must prove his actual innocence to
establish prejudice rather than that the jury might have been influenced by his failure to
object. See notes 141-51 infra and accompanying text.
132. The refusal to presume prejudice on collateral attack, see note 195 'nJfa, contrasts
sharply with the Supreme Court's willingness to presume prejudice on direct appeal. See
Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (on direct appeal defendant's conviction reversed-without allegation of prejudice--on ground of trial court's order barring defendant
from talking with attorney during recess); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (refusal
to let counsel give summation unconstitutional regardless of simplicity of case or of strength
of government's evidence).
133. The defendant may also be unable to establish how the defense strategy might
have changed had the attorney objected. Without an obligation to consult with the defendant, counsel could always explain that he would have done nothing different. See note 118
su.pra.

Nor is prejudice probably established by showing that counsel failed to object to evidence "essential" to the government's case, but see Crowell v. Zahradnick, 571 F.2d 1257, 1262
(4th Cir. 1977) (Winter, J., dissenting), because Sykes' admissions were "essential" to his conviction on the evidence introduced by the government in its case-in-chief.
134. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). The Agurs Court did not want to
give the jury another opportunity to "flout" the evidence. Id at 108 n.15 (quoting Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 90 (1963)). But Congress has not enacted proposed legislation that
would have required the habeas petitioner to show both that the principal purpose of the
constitutional claim was to protect the reliability of the factfinding process and that "a different result would probably have obtained if such constitutional violation had not occurred."
S. 567, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1973).
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case for reversal than a habeas petition, since it is usually made
before the conviction becomes final. Second, the Court will probably
35
not use the "plain error" doctrine as a guide to actual prejudice,
136
even though Justices White and Powell appear ready to do so.
Used to grant relief on direct appeal, 37 the plain error rule would
limit relief to "exceptional circumstances." 38 Nonetheless, the flexibility of the plain error rule might make its use in the habeas context
39
result in grants of habeas relief more often than the Court intends.
In Estelle, Francis, and Sfykes the Court did not discuss the relationship between Rule 33
and habeas prejudice because those cases involved state convictions. But Rule 33's test for
grant of a new trial motion may help identify the meaning of prejudice for habeas purposes.
Because a motion for new trial must be made quickly (usually within 2 years of verdict if
based on newly discovered evidence; within 7 days if based on other grounds), and therefore
at a time when the government would not be greatly prejudiced if the conviction is set aside,
one anticipates that the defendant must prove greater harm to warrant habeas relief than to
get a new trial. Rule 33 provides for grant of a new trial "in the interest ofjustice": If the
motion is based on misconduct by counsel, the government, or the court, Rule 33's test usually requires more than "harmless error"; if based on newly discovered evidence, the test
requires, among other things, that the new evidence would probably have resulted in acquittal. See 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 551,557 (1969). If the Court
intends that habeas relief should be given more grudgingly than a new trial, it may require
the petitioner to show that, but for counsel's failure to object, he could have proved his factual innocence. See notes 141-51 in/ia and accompanying text.
135. The "cause shown" test of Rule 12(i), used to excuse the failure to object, is a
disguised form of the "plain error" doctrine. See 8 MOORE, supra note 105, 12.03[3]. Thus,
if Rule 12 supplies the definition of "actual prejudice," the Court might use the "plain error"
doctrine. By so doing, the Court would confirm the suspicion that it has eliminated any
difference between the relief available on direct appeal and relief available on collateral attack. See note 53 sufira. But see Government of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 551 F.2d 553, 555
n.3 (3d Cir. 1977) (no "necessary congruence" between plain error and Estelle's waiver test).
136. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 99 (1977) (White, J., concurring) (habeas
petitioner meets burden by showing "plain error"); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 514 n.2
(1976) (Powell, J., concurring) ("discretion might sometimes be exercised to overturn a conviction on the familiar principles of plain error").
137. See United States v. Indiviglio, 352 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
907 (1966).
138. United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936).
139. Courts sometimes reverse on the basis of "plain error," for example, without proof
of the effect of that error on the reliability of the verdict, as long as that error was so obvious
that the trial court should have intervened. See id But the Supreme Court's restriction of
habeas relief seems designed to free the habeas court of having to determine the merits of the
claim or of criticizing the trial court's failure to act unless the defendant can identify how his
attorney's failure actually harmed him. In contrast, appellate courts finding plain error commonly presume harm. See King v. United States, 372 F.2d 383, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1967); 8B
MOORE, supra note 105, 52.03[1], at 52-6 to -10. Moreover, a court may reverse for "plain
error" when the error involves the "fairness and integrity" of the judicial proceedings, even if
the guilty verdict appears reliable. 3 C. WRIGHT, supra note 134, § 856, at 374. The Sykes
Court, on the other hand, rejecting the use of a presumption to infer the existence of harm,
was more interested in the reliability of the verdict than the appearance of fairness in the
proceedings. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977).
The Court may be correct in rejecting the plain error rule for federal habeas corpus.
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As a result, to prove actual prejudice, a petitioner probably will
have to demonstrate that the verdict was factually inaccurate. This
criterion may be expressed in two ways. The first would be a new
version of the harmless error rule: The defendant would now have to
prove that the alleged constitutional violation was not harmless.' 4°
The second, which probably captures more accurately the Court's
expectation for a habeas petition, is that the defendant must prove
his or her factual innocence and that counsel's failure to object prevented demonstration of that innocence. 141 To limit habeas relief to
the factually innocent defendant is consistent with the Court's return 142 to an emphasis on fundamental fairness as the test for any
The rule is the epitome of equitable discretion; courts have found grave difficulty in giving it
content and have applied it almost viscerally. 3 C. WRIGHT, supra note 134, § 856, at 373.
140. Normally the state has the burden of proving harmlessness to preserve a conviction. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Both Estelle and Sykes suggest a shift
in the burden, since both found harmless error even though the Fifth Circuit had held that
the state could prove the harmlessness of neither the jail clothes in Estelle nor the defendant's
statements in Sykes. See notes 45 & 92 sura and accompanying text.
Significantly, then Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist testified before a congressional
subcommittee that one way to limit federal habeas relief was "by a significant broadening of
the harmless error rule." Rehnquist Testimony, supra note 24, at 112; cf.LiPuma v. Commissioner, Dept. of Corrections, 560 F.2d 84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977) (district
court erred in saying it could not conclude "beyond a reasonable doubt" that defense motion
would have failed and that there was a "reasonable possibility of prejudice to petitioner").
141. This test of factual innocence is not explicitly mentioned in Estelle, Francis,or Sykes,
but it is the core of the Court's decision in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976)
(habeas review not available for fourth amendment claim adjudicated in state court; exclusionary rule does not go to innocence or guilt) and its more recent decision in Ballew v.
Georgia, 98 S.Ct. 1029 (1978). In deciding that 5-person juries in criminal cases were unconstitutional, the Ballew Court discussed the risks of convicting an innocent defendant as the
size of the jury decreased, and of acquitting a guilty person as the size of the jury increased.
Id at 1036-38. Compare Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1013 n.1 (1976) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (no relief where defendant did not claim to be innocent), with Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (relief where defendant did assert innocence). See also Friendly,
supra note 14, at 160; Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus." A S/udy in Massachuset/s, 87 HARV. L.
REv. 321, 360 (1973). Judge Friendly's test for habeas relief-a "colorable claim of innocence," Friendly, supra note 14, at 160, understates the proof he would require of petitioner;
by acknowledging that in 11 years as a judge he had seen only about six cases where he
doubted petitioner's guilt, Judge Friendly implicitly admitted that he would limit relief to the
most clearly innocent defendants. See id at 160 n.94.
But such a test would break markedly from earlier decisions in which the Court considered "innocence" irrelevant in deciding whether habeas relief should be afforded. See
Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 696 (1949); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1923)
("[W]hat we have to deal with is not the petitioners' innocence or guilt, but solely the question whether their constitutional rights have been preserved.') (Holmes, J.). For a broad discussion of "factual innocence" and habeas, see Cover & Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalisr"
Habeas Corpus andthe Court, 86 YALE LJ. 1035, 1077-100 (1977).
142. There have also been several recent legislative attempts to limit federal habeas
relief to the factually innocent petitioner. See, e.g., S. 567, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG.
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constitutional violation,'4 3 with its decisions that restrict habeas relief
when the defendant has pleaded guilty,' 4 with its refusal to apply
prophylactic rules that are designed to control government behavior, 145 and with its consideration46of prospective application for new
constitutional pronouncements.
REC. 2221 (1973); note 24 supra. For a discussion of other bills, see Note, supra note 24, at

1221; Note, Relieving the Habeas Corpus Burden: A JurisdictionalRemedy, 63 IOwA L. REv. 392
(1977).
These attempts have so far failed. For example, S. 567 died in committee without a
hearing. See Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 634, 637
(1974). One could argue that Congress' refusal to enact any legislative restriction on federal
habeas is an implicit statement of congressional intent to keep federal habeas jurisdiction
consistent with fay and with 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970). See comment by Senator Nelson on
behalf of himself and Senator Mathias accompanying introduction of S. 1314, 123 CONG.
REc. S. 6029, S. 6031 (daily ed., Apr. 20, 1977) (S. 1314 is designed to overrule Francis and
Stone). On this analysis, Estelle, Francir,and Sykes are inconsistent with Congress' intent, a
possibility that the Court did not discuss in those cases. Cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72, 106 & n.7 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress has power to structure
federal habeas jurisdiction and has chosen to require broad federal habeas corpus). Nevertheless, the proposed legislation may influence the Court in deciding how to define actual
prejudice. Then Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist, in testimony before a congressional
committee, urged Congress to restrict federal habeas jurisdiction by requiring either that the
habeas petitioner make a "colorable showing of innocence," or show substantial prejudice.
Rehnquist Testimony, supra note 24, at 112. Justice Rehnquist took the "colorable showing"
test from Friendly, supra note 14, at 160. Judge Friendly would interpret his own test to give
relief only to the petitioner of whose factual innocence the habeas court was relatively certain.
See note 141 supra.
143. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); United States v. Washington, 431
U.S. 181 (1977).
144. Because the defendant's admission of factual guilt bars collateral attack on any
constitutional issue that does not affect the reliability of the guilty plea or liability for punishment where factual guilt is established, see Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975)
(per curiam), the guilty plea cases support the interpretation that habeas relief is now available only to the factually innocent petitioner. See Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 299
(1975) (White, J., dissenting) (because guilty plea "conclusively" establishes factual guilt, no
federal interest in habeas review of matters affecting that issue). The significance of an admission of guilt was not immediately clear from McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970),
where collateral review was barred with respect to the admissibility of the defendant's confession but not to counsel's competency in advising the defendant on his decision to plead guilty.
The McMann Court could have used a waiver analysis, since counsel had discussed challenging the confession with his client before he pleaded guilty. In Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S.
258 (1973), however, collateral review of an attack on the grand jury selection process was
also barred even though counsel had not discussed that challenge with his client and may not
have recognized that he could have objected. The Tollett Court indicated that the waiver
analysis was inapplicable where the defendant had pleaded guilty. Id. at 266.
145. See note 211 infra. Certain Justices have invited the states to enact their own prophylactic rules, but do not intend to impose such rules on the states. See Manson v.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 118 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting states adopt procedures to protect against eyewitness misidentification).
146. In deciding whether to apply a constitutional innovation retroactively, the Warren
Court analyzed the purpose of that innovation, the extent to which law enforcement authorities had relied on the superseded procedure, and the potential impact on the administration
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The Court may not go so far as to condition habeas relief on
proof of factual innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. 4 7 The Court
may recognize that no federal habeas court, especially one that does
not have a complete record of the evidence, can accurately assess the
truth of the verdict.' 4 8 The Court may also decide that federal
habeas courts must retain a limited form of general equity jurisdiction to prevent a "miscarriage of justice,"' 14 9 apart from questions of
strict factual innocence.150 But the Court clearly intends that the
ofjustice of retroactive application. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). If the
purpose of the new command was to "enhance the reliability of the factfinding process at
trial," Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728-29 (1966), the Court was more likely to
apply that command retroactively.
In urging Congress to enact legislation to restrict federal habeas review of constitutional
issues not germane to the reliability of the verdict, the Department of Justice has used the
retroactivity decision to support its position. See Letter from Attorney General Richard
Kleindienst to Rep. Emanuel Celler, June 21, 1972, reprintedin 119 CONG. REC. 2222, 2224
(daily ed. Jan. 26, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Kleindienst Letter].
147. Although the Court should define "actual prejudice" as precisely as possible, it
might nonetheless authorize the habeas court to reverse as a prophylactic measure in any case
of unfairness or government misconduct. For example, Justice Rehnquist, in his testimony as
an Assistant Attorney General, suggested habeas relief if "the type of trial to which [the petitioner] was subjected was grossly unfair," Rehnquist Testimony, supra note 24, at 100, a standard
he would reserve for "actually coerced confessions, mob domination of juries, failure to appoint counsel, and other claims of that magnitude." Id at 102. The Department ofJustice
later acknowledged that federal habeas should be available for claims involving the "very
integrity" of the factfinding process, including the rights to counsel and confrontation and the
government's use of perjured testimony. See Kleindienst Letter, supra note 146, at 2225.
H.R. 13,772, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), which the Department of Justice supported, differed
from the previously proposed bill H.R. 11,441, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), that would have
permitted habeas relief only if the constitutional violation was not harmless and there existed
a substantial doubt about petitioner's guilt. H.R. 13,772 focused more on the "basic fairness" of the adjudication of guilt than on petitioner's guilt or innocence, as H.R. 11,441 did.
Kleindienst Letter, supra note 146, at 2225.
148. In another context the Court recently conceded that a determination of innocence-and, thus, conversely, of guilt-is not necessarily factually accurate. See United
States v. Scott, 98 S. Ct. 2187, 2197 n.l1 (1978) (dismissal of count on ground of pretrial delay
not a determination of factual innocence triggering double jeopardy protection).
To require the defendant to prove his factual innocence would also present the habeas
court with a difficult problem of deciding what evidence it should consider. What if, for
example, evidence had been excluded or not offered at trial that the defendant (or, conversely, the prosecution) claimed, on habeas review, was relevant to his innocence? While a
habeas court usually refuses to decide whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the jury's
verdict, see Clarke v. Huff, 119 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1941), will the habeas court not face such
questions in evaluating whether the defendant was factually innocent?
149. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977). The question, of course, is whether a
"miscarriage ofjustice" occurs only if an innocent defendant is convicted because of counsel's
failure, or whether that term also includes misconduct by the government or court.
150. Cf.Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (reversal for resentencing, even without defense objection, where trial court used confidential presentence report, undisclosed to
defendant's counsel or to reviewing court upon appeal, in sentencing defendant to death).
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defendant make "some showing" 51' of innocence, and expects federal
habeas courts to treat petitions skeptically.
A "factual innocence" standard of "actual prejudice," especially
152
in conjunction with the new restrictive rule of Stone v. Powell, will

eliminate from habeas review certain types of constitutional attack
that the defendant could have made under Fay because their violation would not threaten the reliability of a jury verdict. The following motions or objections would disappear from habeas review: any
attack on the institution of criminal proceedings,' 5 3 other than a
claim of double jeopardy or some other challenge to the trial court's
jurisdiction; 4 certain rights granted by statute;' 5 5 a due process
Rochin v. Califomia-type5 6 challenge to the government's conduct;
right-to-counsel questions arising under Massiah v. UnitedStates;157 the
The significance of Gardner is clouded, however, because the Court assumed that the state
courts had reached the issue despite counsel's failure to object, thus authorizing federal
habeas review under Brown . Allam Id at 361.
151. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84 (1977).
152. Stone barred federal habeas review of a fourth amendment question decided by the
state court, review that Brown v.Allen would normally have authorized. See Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 522-29 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); notes 246-59 infia and accompanying
text.
153. In Francis, the court of appeals suggested that actual prejudice might exist if a
grand jury apparently discriminated against co-suspects of different races by indicting one
but not the other on identical evidence. Newman v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974).
In its reversal, the Francis Court did not comment on that example, an example that would
have nothing to do with the reliability of the petit jury's verdict. Cf Castaneda v. Partida,
430 U.S. 482, 508 n.1 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Stone v.Powell might bar
federal habeas review of a grand jury objection decided by state court). Even if federal
habeas review of a grand jury issue remains available, the petitioner may be unable to get the
proof necessary to establish that prejudice. See note 79 supra.
154. See cases cited in note 101 supra. While these issues do not relate to factual innocence, the Court seems willing to address them on collateral attack.
155. While 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255 (1970) provide habeas relief if the petitioner is
in custody in violation of federal laws, certain statutory protections have nothing to do with
innocence. Cf.United States v. Williams, 544 F.2d 1215, 1218 (4th Cir. 1976) (on direct
appeal defendant not entitled to presumption of harm where statutory right to appointment
of two attorneys violated).
156. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (police use of stomach pump to seize
contraband "shocked conscience" and violated due process). Protection afforded by any prophylactic rule would presumably disappear on collateral review, unless the Sykes Court intended, by its term "miscarriage of justice," 433 U.S. at 91, to authorize relief whenever
outrageous conduct contributed to the defendant's conviction, whether committed by the
government or others, see note 147 supra, or whenever the punishment was extreme, see note
127 supra.
157. 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (government agent's questioning of defendant without counsel
present violated right to counsel). While such violations would probably produce reliable
evidence, but cf.Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 426 n.8 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(noting there was no indication that Massiah's statements were reliable), they nonetheless
might remain open for federal habeas as part of the right to counsel.
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a violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure;'59 discriminatory prosecution; 16° any alleged violation of the exclusionary rule, 6 ' including Mapp v. Ohio, 6 2 M'iranda
v. Arizona,163 or Wade v. UnitedStates issues;"6 and probably erroneous
1 65
or incomplete jury instructions.

Certain objections or motions 66 do concern the reliability of the
factfinding process and may therefore survive the "factual inno-

cence" test of actual prejudice: a due process attack on an identifica69
16 8
tion procedure;16 an involuntary confession; prejudicial joinder;'
the right to a speedy trial where the defense has lost a crucial witness;170 the defendant's appearance in jail clothes before the jury or
72
inflammatory pretrial publicity;' 7 1 the use of perjured testimony;
158. See Kleindienst Letter, supra note 146, at 2225.
159. Id But cf. Note, Rule 11 and CollateralAttack on Guily Pleas, 86 YALE L.J. 1395
(1977) (arguing that evidentiary hearings necessary to resolve petitioner's attack on guilty
plea). Denial of collateral review of Rule 11 issues would apply only to federal prisoners
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
160. See general'y People v. MacFarland, 540 P.2d 1073 (Colo. 1975).
161. A principal purpose of the proposed legislative restrictions on federal habeas has
been to eliminate review of exclusionary rule issues. See Kleindienst Letter, supra note 146, at
2225.
162. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth amendment).
163. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (police interrogation).
164. 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (lineup).
165. While refusing to give or misstating instructions on the presumption of innocence
or reasonable doubt may violate due process, see Taylor v. Kentucky, 98 S. Ct. 1930 (1978);
Dunn v. Perrin, 570 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1978), habeas challenges to other instructions, either
given over objection or not given when requested, are unlikely to warrant relief. See Lakeside
v. Oregon, 98 S. Ct. 1091 (1978) (no due process violation to instruct, over defendant's objection, on defendant's failure to testify); Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977) (failure to
give causation instruction not reversible error) (Court did not discuss whether habeas review
should have been barred by counsel's failure to object, a ground on which ChiefJustice Burger would have denied review, id at 157); cf. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 (1973) (failure
to instruct or instruction given must violate constitution and not simply be universally condemned to warrant reversal).
166. An interesting question is whether collateral relief would remain for defenses like
insanity, self-defense, and entrapment, which excuse the defendant from responsibility for his
actions.
167. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
168. See Kleindienst Letter, supra note 146, at 2225.
169. If counsel fails to object, however, the client gets relief only if the trial court should
have intervened. See Cupo v. United States, 359 F.2d 990, 993-94 (D.C. Cir. 1966). In contrast, if counsel objected, prejudice is presumed ifjoinder was improper. See Ward v. United
States, 289 F.2d 877 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
170. But cf. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977) (delay in indictment not
necessarily ground for dismissal even though defendant lost important witness).
171. Set Kleindienst Letter, supra note 146, at 2225. Either might undercut the jury's
ability to fairly assess the evidence at the trial.
172. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Kleindienst Letter, supra note 146, at
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Additionally, the defendant could
or a confrontation clause issue.'
show actual prejudice if, but for the constitutional violation, he
174
or if he might have
might have been convicted of a lesser charge
1 75
punishment.
lesser
a
to
been sentenced
Nevertheless, that a constitutional right is not automatically excluded from habeas review under the "factual innocence" test of actual prejudice does not mean that its violation will necessarily result
in relief. 176 The defendant must show not just that the alleged violation usually threatens the reliability of the factfinding process, but
also how that violation undercut the reliability of the verdict in his or
herparticularcase. 7' Federal habeas courts probably will separate the
challenged evidence from the remainder of the record to evaluate the
likelihood that an innocent defendant was convicted. Thus, if the
only evidence that the government introduced was allegedly tainted,
the habeas court might grant relief.' 78 But if other evidence, whethto support the conviction,
er direct or circumstantial, was sufficient
79
the habeas court would deny relief.'
C.

The Defendant's Burden of ProofUnder "Cause and Prejudice"

Under Fay v. Noa, though the defendant may have had the burden of going forward with the production of evidence to prove that
no deliberate bypass had occurred, 8 ' the state probably had the bur173. Cf Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (defendant stressed his innocence
in trying to challenge nonparty's repudiation of own confession to crime).
174. See Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974), afdon othergrounds, 425 U.S.
501 (1976).
175. See Jiminez v. Estelle, 557 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1977) (trial court used unobjected to,
unconstitutional prior conviction in sentencing); Kleindienst Letter, supra note 146, at 2225;
cf. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972) (remand to determine if petitioner deliberately
bypassed opportunity to object to continuation of commitment).
176. For one thing, if the habeas petitioner does not recognize his burden or artfully
tailor his allegations, the habeas court will probably deny relief without requiring the state to
respond.
177. For a comparison of the virtues of a categorical, as opposed to those of a case-bycase, analysis of actual prejudice under the "factual innocence" classification, see Cover &
Aleinikoff, supra note 141, at 1088-91.
178. See Friendly, supra note 14, at 163-64.
179. Analyzing whether the defendant suffered actual prejudice caused by a constitutional violation thus differs from deciding whether the violation occurred in the first place.
Cf Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 118 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that in
deciding whether pretrial identification procedure was constitutional, court should not consider other evidence of guilt).
180. This was, however, one of the many unsettled questions under Fa. Under FED.
R. CRIM. P. 12 the defendant must show cause to excuse the failure to object. See United
States v. Freeling, 31 F.R.D. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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den of persuasion. 8 ' Since theJohnson v. Zerbst waiver doctrine relied on by Fay prohibited judicial presumption of a waiver from a
silent record, 8 2 the defendant could satisfy the burden of going forward simply by denying bypass. The state then had to demonstrate
that the defense had in fact deliberately bypassed the opportunity to
object. 183 Under this rule the government in some cases had developed evidence that the attorney had in fact committed a deliberate
bypass, 8 4 and in other cases had convinced the habeas court that it
could infer from the record a deliberate bypass because the failure to
object was consistent with the defense's trial strategy.' 85 But the government's burden often caused it to choose not to oppose a habeas
petition on the ground of deliberate bypass. 18 6 Moreover, the defendant under Fa probably had the burden of establishing only a prima
facie case that a constitutional violation had occurred. If the defendant did that, the burden passed to the government to prove that
no constitutional7 violation had occurred, or that the violation was
harmless error.

18

But the Supreme Court has now made clear that the defendant
carries the burden of persuasion on both cause for and actual
prejudice resulting from the failure to object. 8 ' The decisions of the
court of appeals and the Supreme Court in Sykes illustrate this shift
in the defendant's burden of proof. The court of appeals refused to
181. See United States ex reL Schaedel v. Follette, 275 F. Supp. 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
182. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
464 (1938)).
183. See United States ex rel Schaedel v. Follette, 275 F. Supp. 548, 554 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Wright & Sofaer, FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-Finding

Responsibiliy, 75 YALE L.J. 895, 967 (1966). But see Nash v. United States, 342 F.2d 366 (5th
Cir. 1965) (defendant has burden to prove no deliberate bypass because judgment carries
presumption of correctness).
184. The attorney-client privilege did not bar testimony by the attorney about his purpose in not objecting. See Henderson v. Heinze, 349 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1965).
185. See cases cited in notes 15-16 supra.
186. See, e.g., Williams v. Beto, 364 F. Supp. 335 (S.D. Tex. 1973), reo'don other grounds,
500 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974), reo'd, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
187. See Partida v. Castaneda, 524 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1976) (government had burden to
rebut defendant's prima facie showing of discrimination in grand jury selection; prejudice not
discussed), aj'd, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). But cf. Bruce v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 1051, 1058-59 (5th
Cir. 1976) (defendant had burden to prove by preponderance of evidence that he was incompetent to stand trial; greater burden might present due process issue).
188. The tests are independent, and proof of actual prejudice is not enough without
proof that excuses the failure to object. See Jiminez v. Estelle, 557 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1977)
(defendant actually prejudiced because given greater sentence through use of prior conviction; remand to determine whether cause existed). But see Arnold v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d
964, 968-69 (5th Cir. 1975) (refusing to decide whether tests are independent because defendant established neither).
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infer that the attorney had made a deliberate decision not to object,
because it could detect no tactical reason why counsel had failed to
object to the introduction of the defendant's statement into evidence."8 9 Rejecting this approach, the Supreme Court noted that
the defendant had not proved the impossibility that the failure to
object at the trial level was a tactical choice. 9°
Under the new test, the burden is on the defendant to establish
"cause" to excuse the failure to object. To place that burden on the
defendant means that the federal habeas court is no longer required
to review the trial record to determine whether the attorney deliberately bypassed the opportunity to object when counsel has not explained the failure to object in testimony or affidavit. The defendant
must now establish why the attorney did not object; it is insufficient
to indicate that defense counsel failed to consult with the defendant
or that the defendant did not agree with counsel's apparent decision
not to object. Nor is it enough for the defendant to aver that the
failure to object constituted ineffective representation.' 9 ' Counsel's
incompetency might constitute cause, but that allegation, standing
1 92

alone, is not enough.

189. Wainwright v. Sykes, 528 F.2d 522, 528 (5th Cir. 1976). The court of appeals did
not cite eitherJohnson or Fay, but its conclusion was clearly based on those two cases.
190. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977).
191. See Lumpkin v. Ricketts, 551 F.2d 680, 682-83 (5th Cir. 1977) (if assertion of ineffective representation established cause, that test would be eliminated; but no explanation of
how petitioner proves cause).
192. In determining whether counsel's failure to object constituted ineffective representation, courts must decide whether to focus solely on the significance of that failure, or to
assess that failure as one part of counsel's overall performance. Compare McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (suggesting focus on particular action), with Cooper v. Fitzharris,
551 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1977), rehearingen banc ordered, Sept. 22, 1977 (focus on counsel's overall competence), and Williams v. State, 477 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (counsel's
overall performance competent; trial not a farce or mockery).
In saddling the defendant with the burden of showing cause, the Court did not discuss,
and perhaps failed to appreciate, the problems that the defendant will face in determining
why counsel did not object. If defense attorneys are not required to consult with their clients,
and if they can make all strategic decisions for their clients, see notes 50 & 118 supra, then
defendants may not learn of their attorneys' failure to object until long after convictions
become final. Defendants may have grave difficulty learning why their attorneys refrained
from objecting: Lawyers rarely document their reasons for not doing things. Even those
attorneys who recognized the possibility of objecting and had reasons for not doing so may
well forget those reasons during the interval between trial and federal habeas petition. Further, as in Francis where trial counsel became ill, see text accompanying note 63 supra, the
attorney may be unavailable to testify at a habeas hearing. Finally, some attorneys may
fabricate tactical justifications for their past failures out of fear for their professional reputations. Cf. United States ex re. Johnson v. Johnson, 531 F.2d 169, 175-76 & n.17 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1977) (counsel who could have been unaware that government could not ordinarily use defendant's prior convictions to impeach explained his failure
to put client on stand by claiming defendant would have put own character in issue and
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Finally, in addition to proving cause, the defendant also bears the
burden of proving "prejudice." The Court in Sykes expressly refused
to follow the court of appeals in presuming prejudice as a result of
the introduction of the defendant's statement. 93 Even under the
new test, a defendant who has established a prima facie case still will
be entitled to a presumption that a constitutional violation oca presumption
curred.'9 4 But the defendant will not be entitled 1to
95
that the violation caused prejudice to the defense.
The new habeas cases therefore place a dramatically higher evidentiary burden on a defendant who fails to raise a claim at trial
who
than the one borne by a defendant who does object at trial or
19 6
courts.
state
the
in
decided
claim
her
or
his
of
merits
has the
thereby rendered prior convictions admissible); Johns v. Perini, 462 F.2d 1308, 1313 (6th Cir.
1972) (counsel deemed understandably defensive about reputation). Counsel's admission of
a failure to do something could provide prima facie proof of civil malpractice, although the
failure might not even have damaged the client if, for example, the defendant is reconvicted
at retrial.
For a thorough discussion of the effect of the new habeas decisions on the attorney-client
relationship, see Part IV inca.
193. Compare 433 U.S. at 91, with 528 F.2d at 526-27.
194. Cf Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (white defendant challenging racial bias in
jury selection stated due process objection sufficient for factfinding remand).
195. See Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 245 (1973). The petitioner must prove
actual prejudice, because he is not entitled to the presumption of innocence after his conviction becomes final. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 840 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610-11 (1974).
Eliminating a presumption of prejudice where the defense did not object will eliminate
habeas relief for many defendants. Compare Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976)
(conviction reversed on direct appeal even though defendant failed to show how judge's order
that defendant not consult with counsel prejudiced defense), with United States v. Williams,
544 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1976) (defendant with single lawyer not entitled to irrebuttable presumption of prejudice on basis of statute giving right to representation by two attorneys in
capital cases).
196. For an illustration of this difference, see Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
Petitioner, whose untimely motion had been decided on the merits by the Texas appellate
court, used statistical evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in grand jury
selection. That prima facie proof shifted the burden to the state, a burden it had not met.
The court of appeals remanded to the district court to reverse the conviction or for further
fact findings, see id at 509, a remand affirmed by the Supreme Court, id at 501. If the
district court concluded that the state had not met its burden, it should reverse the conviction. In contrast, if the state courts had not decided the merits, the defendant would have
had to prove both cause and actual prejudice, burdens he almost certainly could not have
carried.
A further example of this remarkable difference emerges in a comparison of Francis and
its companion case in the Fifth Circuit, Newman v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974).
As in Francis, the defendant in Newman had failed to make a timely objection to the grand
jury, but a state appellate court denied Newman's attack on the merits. Id at 897. In both
cases, the federal district court on habeas review had reversed after finding jury discrimination. The Fifth Circuit remanded Newman with directions to dismiss, but remanded Francis
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THE IRONIC HARVEST OF "CAUSE AND PREJUDICE"

Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Wainwright v. Skes contains the
Court's general justification for what Justice Rehnquist admits to be
the substantial restriction the new habeas cases place on the access to
federal collateral review achieved by Fay v. Noia.'9 7 Without adverting at all to the traditional arguments proffered in favor of liberal
habeas review,' 9 8 and without offering any substantial empirical or
precedential basis for his own arguments, Justice Rehnquist offers
several specific judicial goals which he claims will be better served by
the cause and prejudice test than by the Fay bypass test. Those goals
appear to converge into a general asserted interest in encouraging the
resolution of constitutional claims in the state courts as a means of
ending litigation and reducing the workload of the federal habeas
courts. 199
to permit a determination of whether the facts constituted a showing of prejudice. Id at 899.
The Supreme Court affirmed Francis, 425 U.S. 536 (1976), but remanded Newman for further
consideration, Newman v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 967 (1976). Upon remand of Newman, the
court of appeals affirmed the district court's reversal because the defense had made an unrebutted prima facie showing of discrimination. Because the state court had reached the merits, the court of appeals thought that it could also do so, in effect overruling its earlier decision
that had conditioned habeas review on a showing of cause and prejudice. Newman v. Henderson, 539 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1976).
197. See 433 U.S. at 87. In justifying the new restrictions on federal habeas, Justice
Rehnquist did not reinterpret Fay's own historical analysis of the scope of the habeas writ, see
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-426 (1963). He did note the shifts in the Court's interpretation of the scope of the writ, but did not briticize those shifts. See 433 U.S. at 77-84. Justice
Powell, who concurred in Skes, challenged Fay's historical analysis in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250, 252-56 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). Compare Oaks, LegalHistoy in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REv. 451 (criticizing Fay's history), with

Tushnet, supra note 102, at 487 (criticizing Justice Powell's history). The dispute over whose
view of history is revisionist illustrates that the focus should be on the competing interests in
the habeas question, unless Congress decides to enact new legislation.
198. Four basic reasons may be given to justify liberal habeas review. First, habeas
review acts as a substitute for direct appeal to the Supreme Court, because the Court accepts
direct appeals so infrequently. See Haynsworth, supra note 14, at 601; Note, supra note 24, at
1224 n.19 (reviewing the number of appeals the Court hears). Second, Fa in effect guaranteed review by one federal court of federal constitutional issues. See Amsterdam, Search,
Seizure and Section 2255." A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 380 (1964).

Third, state courts

will not faithfully enforce federal constitutional law because local pressures force them to
concentrate on the question of guilt or innocence. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 510-11
(1953) (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion); Developments in the Law-FederalHabeas Corpus, 83

HARV. L. Rsv. 1038, 1060-66 (1970). But see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35
(1976) (disagreeing with this fear). Finally, federal habeas review will promote the uniform
application of federal constitutional law. See Note, supra note 24, at 1226 & n.28 (citing
authorities).
199. The Court's habeas decisions must be read along with its decisions limiting the
power of the federal courts to interfere with continuing state criminal and civil proceedings.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Court developed fully its concern for comity
and federalism and its belief that state courts will properly interpret and enforce the Federal
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This part first analyzes the validity of this interest in finality,
questioning its empirical and jurisprudential foundation. It then
proceeds to examine a striking irony of the new decisions: that by
directing its attack on Fay rather than Brown v. Allen, the Court may
have achieved the worst of two worlds. It has denied future petitioners any forum for a constitutional claim unraised at trial, while potentially exacerbating the very friction between state and federal
courts which the cause and prejudice test was designed in part to
relieve.
A.

The Finali) Interest
1.

The interest defined.

The new cause and prejudice test greatly enhances the power of
the states-previously denied them by Fay-to prevent federal
habeas relief for defendants by enforcing procedural waiver rules
against claims not raised at trial. Justice Rehnquist closed his majority opinion in Sykes by elaborating a number of justifications which
he hopes will result from this new restriction: (1) It increases the
chances of a state court hearing on the constitutional claim if the
defense objects, and so may provide future federal habeas courts with
a more complete and accurate record for their decisions; 2 °0 (2) it may
obviate a few federal habeas petitions, since some defendants will
actually win their claims if they raise them at trial, and thereby
either gain acquittal or at least eliminate the claim from later
review;20 1 (3) it may prevent attorneys from cynically "sandbagging"--deliberately withholding an objection and gambling that if
the defendant is not acquitted at trial he could win reversal by raising the claim on federal habeas review; 20 2 (4) it will encourage the
states to enforce their procedural forfeiture rules; 20 3 and (5) it will
Constitution. Younger has been much criticized. See Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris:
Dtference in Search ofa Rationale, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 463 (1978) (criticizing Younger and citing
other negative commentary). The Court's interest is understandable: All participants-the
defendant, counsel, the government, the trial court, and the federal habeas court-would be
served if the state trial court decided the issue. Witnesses are more likely to remember the
relevant facts, the trial court can better assess their credibility, and the habeas court will have
a more complete record if it must review the state court's decision. The question remains,
however, whether the defendant should be effectively stripped of habeas review if counsel
does not object, as Estelle, Francs, and Syke.r portend.
200. 433 U.S. at 88. Justice Rehnquist apparently assumes that defense counsel will
object more frequently after having read Francis and Sykes, a questionable assumption.
201. Id at 88-89.
202. Id at 89.
203. Id at 90.
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enhance respect for the state trial as the "main event" rather than a
"tryout" before ultimate federal disposition. °4
Though Justice Rehnquist offered little or no support for the proposition that these judicial goals required a severe retrenching of
Fa,,2 °5 the general interest in finality and judicial efficiency into
which these goals converge seems superficially plausible. Federal
habeas courts have faced difficult and burdensome work in interpreting issues that defendants appear to raise, or in determining whether
deliberate bypass has occurred, or in deciding whether to require the
state to respond to the petition and to hold a federal habeas hearing.20 6 Aided by an attorney or a clever "jail-house lawyer," the de204. As Justice Brennan himself noted in dissent, see 433 U.S. at 115, Justice Rehnquist
omitted perhaps the most compelling reason for restricting habeas review: the government's
difficulty in gathering evidence to rebut the petitioner's prima facie case and in retrying the
petitioner after a reversal of conviction. Cf Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 434
U.S. 257 (1978) (rejecting state's petition for reconsideration of habeas relief as untimely after
delay caused by difficulty in locating police officers who had arrested petitioner and could
testify as to probable cause).
In his concurring opinion in Sy.kes, Chief Justice Burger offered an additional, and indirectly related, justification: that the new rule would prevent disruption of trials caused by
unnecessary consultations between attorney and client. See 433 U.S. at 92-94 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring). The Chief Justice sought to restrict the Fay bypass standard to those decisions
which only defendants themselves could make--such as the decision of the defendant in Fay
not to appeal, see note 50 supra.
The Chief Justice expressed concern that if Fay applied to the myriad tactical decisions
an attorney must make during trial, judges would have to permit intolerable interruptions in
trials to assure that the defendants knowingly and intelligently approved every decision of
counsel. 433 U.S. at 93 (Burger, CJ., concurring). He therefore saw the cause and prejudice
test as a means of reducing trial disruption by keeping responsibility for most tactical decisions on counsel. The Chief Justice's concern may be correct if applied to those evidentiary
objections which counsel could not anticipate; the attorney cannot be expected to confer with
the defendant about the form of every prosecution question or the answer given by every
witness. Even Justice Brennan agreed that counsel could bind the client in situations where
the client's participation was not feasible. 433 U.S. at 116 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although the ChiefJustice thought that Justice Brennan's concession on this point was an "extraordinary modification" of Fay, 433 U.S. at 94 (Burger, CJ., concurring), Justice Brennan
had probably already modified his Ray position in Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451-52
(1965). But the Chief Justice's concern is invalid with respect to most constitutional objections. Any attorney who plans the defense should be able to anticipate possible constitutional
objections, especially since such procedural rules as FED. R. CRIM. P. 12 already force attorneys to plan objections in advance or lose the right to direct appeal of a claim.
205. The fact that the Court has frequently changed its position on the availability of
habeas review, as Justice Rehnquist pointed out, 433 U.S. at 81, certainly does not in itself
justify rejecting the clear holding of the Warren Court that providing a federal forum was
more important than ending litigation by legal fiction in the name of judicial efficiency, Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963); cf. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 226 (1969)
(mechanism for relief necessary to protect constitutional rights relating to the criminal trial
process).
206. The sequential obligations of the federal district courts are outlined in RULES
GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254 (1977).
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fendant can frequently devise constitutional attacks on his conviction
even years after it has become final.2 °7 Perhaps most compelling is
the argument that allowing collateral review of claims unraised at
trial deprives the federal courts of a record of the evidence relevant to
deciding the merits of the claims.20 8
Moreover, Justice Rehnquist's tip of the balancing scales in favor
of ending litigation over providing a federal forum finds some precedential support within the Burger Court's own interpretation of certain Warren Court decisions as creating remedial devices to police
government conduct rather than actual substantive rights.20 9 Since
the Burger Court has not extended those remedies to new factual
situations, 2 10 the Court may not believe it necessary to provide
habeas review to ensure that the states properly apply these
remedies.2 1 1
2.

The interest scrutinized.

Nevertheless, for several reasons, this interest in finality is a highly
suspect justification for the grave retrenchment of federal habeas relief effected by the cause and prejudice rule. First, the empirical
data that exist on the subject of the federal courts' habeas workload
suggest that Justice Rehnquist's implied assertion of the need for reduction of that workload may be greatly exaggerated. 1 2 Second, as
The Court may be especially concerned about the time required to process habeas petitions. See note 223 infra. See generally Shapiro, supra note 141; Note, supra note 142.
207. This fear may be overstated, since the defendant cannot relitigate an already rejected claim simply by altering the facts and allegations. See Cunningham v. Estelle, 536
F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1976) (no review of counsel's competency because petitioner had unsuccessfully raised that issue earlier).
208. If the state courts develop a record of the relevant evidence, the district court may
not need to conduct its own factfinding hearing. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)
(explaining when habeas court must hold evidentiary hearing); cf. O'Berry v. Wainwright,
546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977) (sufficient information developed at
trial to decide merits of fourth amendment issue not raised at trial).
209. Set, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (interpreting Miranda warnings
as prophylactic safeguards).
210. See, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (refusing to apply United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (excluding identifications where counsel was not present at
lineup) to preindictment lineups).
211. The present Court has generally been critical of prophylactic remedies. See, e.g.,
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377-80 (1976) (denying injunction against city officials to force
more thorough review of police conduct; federalism should restrict use of federal equity power
to create prophylactic procedures to control misconduct by a few state employees); Cover &
Aleinikoff, supra note 141, at 1084-85 & nn. 226-27; cf. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,
446-54 (1976) (questioning deterrent value of fourth amendment's exclusionary rule).
212. Justice Rehnquist cited no statistics concerning the numbers of habeas petitions.
In 1976, 9254 habeas petitions were filed in the federal district courts by state and federal
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Justice Brennan argued, the Court's implicit balance of the need to
limit access to a federal forum to achieve finality and efficiency
against the interest of defendants in having constitutional claims adjudicated may violate a deliberate congressional balance in favor of
the latter.' 1 3 Third, as Justice Brennan also noted, invoking the
finality interest where an attorney may have inadvertently neglected
to raise a constitutional claim at trial irrationally penalizes hapless
defendants in hopes of deterring the negligence of counsel.2 14
But perhaps the most serious flaw in Justice Rehnquist's invocation of the finality justification for the cause and prejudice test lies in
his faulty assumptions about the motives and abilities of defense trial
attorneys, assumptions underscored by the specific rationale that the
new test would prevent attorneys from "sandbagging" in state trials.
Comparison with the Fay Court's notions about defense attorneys
helps reveal the fragility of these assumptions.

defendants. The numbers have decreased since 1970, the high point, during which 10,613
petitions were filed. See 1976 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OffiCE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 94. The Heny Court was certainly aware of
the work involved with habeas petitions. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 452-53 & n.8
(1965). Despite the work involved, however, the question remains whether Congress and not
the Court should decide where scarce judicial resources should be directed, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 525-26 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting), although that question of course
begs the other question of Congress' actual intent in enacting 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1970).
That few habeas petitions are granted suggests that reviewing the flood of petitions is not
worth the effort; on the other hand, because relief is granted so rarely, the argument that
federal habeas review interferes too much with state interests is probably exaggerated. The
type of relief granted is also a significant consideration-in few cases is the petitioner actually
released from custody. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 498 (Frankfurter, J.) (separate
opinion) (in 4-year period only five petitioners released).
213. See 433 U.S. at 106-07 & n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Congress chose to provide a
federal forum for preserving federal rights by authorizing litigation of constitutional claims in
federal district court). In neither Estele, Francis,or Sykes did the Court face the question of
how Congress wanted the federal habeas courts to treat procedural defaults by state defendants. Only in Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), did the Burger Court face this
question, where the issue was whether a federally convicted defendant, having failed to challenge the grand jury selection process before trial in violation of FED. R. CRIM. P. 12, could
receive collateral review of that issue absent a deliberate bypass. The Court thought not to
give collateral relief to such a defendant was inconsistent with Rule 12(f)'s test that the defendant show "cause" to excuse noncompliance with the Rule in order to warrant direct
review of the issue. See notes 68-70 supraand accompanying text. There was, however, no
legislative history to clarify congressional intent on this issue. Later, in Francis, the Court
held that "comity" required extending the Davir interpretation of congressional "intent" to
cover state defendants who violated state procedural rules. See notes 76-79 supra and accompanying text.
214. 433 U.S. at 113-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The Sykes Court's misconception of defense counsel.

As it did in Davis,21 5 the Court in Sykes assessed both the attorney's motives in not objecting and the attorney's ability to recognize
the need to object differently from the Fay Court. One could argue
that Fay was designed to force the attorney to consult with his client.
At a time when an attorney's representation was constitutionally
ineffective only if it sunk to the level of a "farce" or a "mockery of
justice, '21 6 Fay could also be viewed as a way to reach constitutional
issues that the attorney had ignorantly or mistakenly failed to raise
when that failure did not equal ineffective representation. 7 Fay indirectly protected the defendant against his attorney's incompetency,
although the Henry Court did limit Fay when it acknowledged that
the attorney could make certain tactical decisions without consulting
his client.21 " But Heny nonetheless seemed to expect that the attorney would make a decision that was intended to achieve some tactical advantage for the defendant at the trial. 219 And Henry did
2 20
require the attorney's decision to have been competent.
The Sykes Court had a different explanation for the attorney's
failure to object. Without citing any examples to justify his factual
assumption, Justice Rehnquist suggested that the Fay deliberate bypass test encouraged attorneys not to object in the trial court in order
to preserve what they hoped would become a winning issue on federal habeas review. The attorney would thus "sandbag" the state
trial and federal habeas courts,2 2 ' because, if the defendant was con215. Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 241 (1973).
216. These were the tests generally used at the time of Fay and Henr,. See, e.g., Frand v.
United States, 301 F.2d 102, 103 (10th Cir. 1962) ("farce"); Edwards v. United States, 256
F.2d 707, 708 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 847 (1958) ("mockery ofjustice"). Most courts
today ask whether counsel was reasonably competent. See note 300 in/ra and accompanying
text.
217. Cf Meador, The Impact of Federal Habeas Corpus on State TrialProcedures, 52 VA. L.
REv. 286, 290-91 (1966) (fay could also reflect lack of confidence in state judges' handling of
constitutional issues).
218. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451-52 (1965). To harmonize Henr , with Pay,
one could interpret Henr , to bar federal habeas relief only if the defendant himself waived the
opportunity to object, but to bar state post-conviction review and direct review by the
Supreme Court if counsel waived that opportunity. Heng, of course, did not clearly make this
distinction. See note 10 supra.
219. 379 U.S. at 450, 451. This expectation underlies the Henr Court's belief that
application of the waiver doctrine (i.e., a deliberate decision by counsel) will usually producethe same results as application of the state's procedural bar. Id at 448 n.3.
220. Id at 450; see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963).
221. 433 U.S. at 89.

Compare ABA POST-CoNvIranON REMEDIES, supra note 19,

§

6.1,

at 89 (agreeing that defense might withhold claims until collateral attack), with Friendly,
supra note 14, at 158 (expressing disbelief that defense would knowingly do so). Judicial
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victed at trial, he could still have his conviction reversed on federal
habeas review. As in Francis, this argument has force if the objection
is to the institution of the charges against the defendant. But Justice
Rehnquist's cynical assumption that defense attorneys cunningly attempt to build, or fail to correct, error in a case makes little sense
whenever the objection involves evidence that the government could
use at trial.2 2 2 To pin one's hopes on a successful habeas petition,
given the time necessary to get that review,22 3 the defendant's
problems in developing the record on habeas review,2 24 and the unlikelihood of success,2 25 is a decision so questionable as to raise an
issue of the attorney's competency. It is also difficult to believe that
an attorney would knowingly forego any opportunity to end the prosuspicion of habeas petitioners is widespread. See Bonds v. Wainwright, 564 F.2d 1125, 1134
n.4 (5th Cir. 1977) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (arguing that prisoner chose not to appeal and
delayed collateral attack until he thought state no longer had trial transcript and thus could
not retry him).
222. That sort of decision by counsel also invites judicial discipline. Cf. McAlaney v.
United States, 539 F.2d 282 (Ist Cir. 1976) (failure to accurately represent plea bargaining to
client calls attorney's fitness into question); McQueen v. Swenson, 49.8 F.2d 207, 218 n. 15 (8th
Cir. 1974) (indicating that counsel would be subject to disciplinary proceedings if he deliberately provided ineffective assistance in order to upset the judicial process); ABA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 7-101 (1976). Because it should also bar
federal habeas as a deliberate bypass under Fay, cf. Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41 (1972)
(per curiam) (where counsel failed to present all known constitutional issues in state postconviction proceeding, as required by state law, federal habeas is barred as to claims not
presented), one suspects that the Sykes Court was more interested in limiting relief to petitioners than in eliminating abuses by counsel.
An issue other than grand jury selection that might involve sandbagging is double jeopardy; an attorney might delay an objection until after jeopardy had attached in the hope of
precluding retrial. Cf Sanabria v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 2170, 2176 (1978) (counsel justified failure to object until close of government's case on ground that objection had not "ripened" until that point); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 394 (1975) (noting, without
deciding, question of effect of defense's decision not to object until jeopardy attached).
223. The time spent in adjudicating a habeas petition is sometimes enormous. Consider the 13-year saga of one petitioner whose attorneys had not subpoenaed four witnesses:
State v. Garton, 371 S.W.2d 283 (Mo. 1963) (denial of direct appeal); State v. Garton, 396
S.W.2d 581 (Mo. 1965) (denial of state collateral attack); Garton v. Swenson, 266 F. Supp.
726 (W.D. Mo. 1967) (federal habeas remand to state courts for hearing); Garton v. State, 454
S.W.2d 522 (Mo. 1970) (denial of relief on remand); Garton v. Swenson, 367 F. Supp. 1355
(W.D. Mo. 1973) (federal habeas denied without hearing); Garton v. Swenson, 497 F.2d 1137
(8th Cir. 1974) (remand to district court to hold evidentiary hearing on question of effectiveness of counsel); Garton v. Swenson, 417 F. Supp. 697 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (relief granted).
224. Initially, the defendant must allege facts which, if true, would warrant relief. See
Pierce v. Cardwell, 572 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1978). But to develop his allegations factually, he
cannot use the discovery methods of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless, and "to the
extent that, the judge in the exercise of his discretion and for good cause shown grants leave to
do so, but not otherwise." RULES GOVERNING SEcrrION 2254 CASES, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254
(1977), Rule 6(a).
225. See Shapiro, supra note 141, at 339-42 (denial rate is about 96%).
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ceedings in favor of his client or, at least, to disrupt the government's
case. Most attorneys would think it wise to object even if they did
not want to suppress all of the evidence that the objection would
cover, or if they thought that the government could use the evidence
in spite of a successful objection. 2 6 If the objection is granted, the
defense attorney controls whether that evidence is admitted. Counsel might alter his attack on the government's evidence, or decide not
to present certain defense evidence if he is no longer worried about
countering the excluded evidence, or even decide to introduce the
evidence himself, or to permit the government to use it. Whatever
his decision, however, he may have succeeded in disrupting the government's case.
Sykes itself is an example.22 7 Sykes testified at his trial to establish that he had been drinking and that he had killed in self-defense.
He was impeached, however, by his statements to the police because
he had not mentioned certain points to them that he added in his
testimony to support his claim of self-defense. 28 If the government
226. Concurring in Sykes, Justice Stevens speculated that trial counsel might have decided not to object because he recognized that the government could use the defendant's
statement, even if suppressed, to impeach his trial testimony. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72, 96-97 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring). Such a decision would make no sense if the government could not carry its burden of proof without the defendant's statement-an assessment of the Sykes evidence that is difficult to make. Even in Sykes, however, an objection
would have preserved the record in case a state appellate court later decided that the state
constitution precluded impeachment use of statements taken in violation of Miranda. See
People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976) (state constitution
forbids use of statement obtained in violation of Miranda for impeachment purposes). Also,
defense counsel might prefer to suppress the statement and then to have the defendant attempt to explain during direct examination any inconsistencies between his or her testimony
and statements to the police.
227. S)kes also suggests other reasons for counsel to object and to demand a hearing.
Defense counsel sometimes want a hearing, even with no chance to prevail on the motion, in
order to get a client to realize that he or she cannot be acquitted at trial and should realistically accept a plea bargain offered by the government. For example, Sykes rejected a government offer to plead guilty to a felony less serious than the one he was convicted of and to
receive a sentence of I year in the countyjail. Sykes wanted ajury trial because he learned a
short time before his trial that ajury had acquitted Angela Davis, charged in California with
aiding an alleged escape attempt in a highly charged political case. Interview with trial
counsel (Mar. 15, 1978). Had there been a hearing on the admissibility of his statements,
Sykes might have recognized the folly of rejecting the plea offer and the risk he ran in going to
trial. Convicted, Sykes was sentenced to 10 years in prison. If the defendant still wants a
trial, counsel may nonetheless have developed information at that hearing to use to impeach
government witnesses who testify at trial.
228. In his testimony Sykes apparently added that the victim, one Willie Gilbert, had
threatened him before leaving Sykes' trailer home, and that after leaving Gilbert had aggres-
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had not introduced Sykes' statement in its case-in-chief, the defense
attorney might have decided not to have Sykes testify. There were
no eyewitnesses to the killing. Several witnesses testified that Sykes
appeared drunk.229 There was fairly strong evidence to support a
self-defense theory without Sykes' testimony. 230 The defense attorney
could, as a result, have decided not to have Sykes testify, reasoning
that the cost of impeachment outweighed whatever Sykes could have
added, in terms of information or credibility, to the self-defense
theory.2 3 '
Justice Rehnquist thus erroneously assumed that a defense attorney generally elects not to object. 32 In fact, counsel's failure is usually the result of his inattention, his ignorance of either the
applicable law or the facts of his client's case, or his inability to appreciate the tactical value or constitutional worth of an objection.

sively turned back toward Sykes with what Sykes thought was a weapon. Interview with
trial counsel (Mar. 15, 1978). When Sykes spoke with the police, he apparently first claimed
that Gilbert had shot himself, and then that he had shot Gilbert when Gilbert "patted his
butt" at Sykes. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae to Supreme Court of the United
States at 51, Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
229. Wainwright v. Sykes, 528 F.2d 522, 524 n.4 (5th Cir. 1976). The police testified
that they would have arrested Sykes for drunkenness had they not arrested him for homicide.
Brief for the Respondent in the Supreme Court of the United States at 5, Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
230. According to trial counsel, Mrs. Sykes testified that her husband and Gilbert had
fought over the shotgun-the murder weapon-before Gilbert left the trailer, that Gilbert
had said as he left that he was going to get a gun, that Gilbert had cut Sykes' hand with a
knife, and that she had been terrified. Interview with trial counsel (Mar. 15, 1978). Additionally, several defense witnesses testified that Gilbert carried a shotgun and had threatened
them at various times. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae to Supreme Court of the
United States at 9. The trial court refused the defense request to instruct the jury that it
could consider the victim's character for violence as evidence that he had attacked first or had
provoked Sykes because Sykes did not know of that character. Interview with trial counsel
(Mar. 15, 1978).
231. Of course, defense counsel might have decided that the jury would accept a selfdefense theory only if Sykes testified. But that judgment, assuming that counsel made it, is
now beyond evaluation. Additionally, had Sykes not testified, the government probably
would have had to introduce ballistics and fingerprint testimony to establish that Sykes' shotgun was the murder weapon. (Also, in some jurisdictions Sykes' inebriation would itself have
provided a defense of diminished responsibility.) Finally, Sykes was also impeached with prior
convictions-for aggravated assault with a pistol and for illegal possession of a firearm-another reason to have kept him from testifying. Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae to Supreme Court of the United States at 9.
232. The Henr , Court seemed to make the same mistake in assuming that the result on
habeas would not differ whether the procedural bar or the waiver doctrine was applied.
Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 448 n.3 (1965). See Hill, supra note 10, at 997.
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Reaffirming Brown While RestrictingFay. The Worst of Both
Worlds
1.

"Double-or-nothing"habeas review.

In Brown v. Allen, decided in 1953, the Supreme Court authorized
the federal habeas courts to reconsider the merits of any constitutional issue of criminal procedure decided by a state court.2 3 3 The
Burger Court restricted the Brown principle somewhat in Stone v.
Powell,234 which barred federal reconsideration of fourth amendment
claims by state defendants. But Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Sykes,
though its careful language did not foreclose future limitation of
Brown v. Allen, implicitly reaffirmed the Brown holding.235 The
Court may therefore appear to have left at least one liberal avenue
open to federal habeas petitioners who raise other than fourth
amendment claims. But the Burger Court's decision in Estelle,
Francis, and Sykes to restrict the scope of Fay instead of Brown has
ironic consequences that may unnecessarily injure criminal defendants while undermining one of its main goals.
Even granted the validity of its judicial goals, the Sykes Court
may have chosen the wrong device to implement them. Under the
new controlling law of federal habeas corpus-the nexus of Brown
and Sykes-the federal habeas courts cannot address the merits of
almost any constitutional claim which a defendant fails to raise at
trial unless the defendant can achieve the difficult feat of proving
cause and prejudice or the state courts choose to ignore their own
procedural forfeiture rules and decide the merits of the claim themselves. A defendant who now complies with the state's procedural
rules gets review of constitutional claims in both the state and federal
habeas courts. The defendant who fails to comply with the state
23 6
procedural rules gets review in neither.
233. 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953).

To date, the sole exception to the Brown rule is that

established for fourth amendment questions by Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). After
Brown, the federal habeas courts can treat the issues resolved and the record developed by the
state courts according to procedures announced in Townsend v. San, 372 U.S. 293 (1963),

and 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970).
234. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
235. See 433 U.S. at 87 ("This rule of Brown v. Allen is in no way changed by our
holding today.'); f id at 80, 81 (reserving question of extending the limited deference to
state decisions established by Brown).
236. The Court will almost certainly create a similar dichotomy in the direct and collateral review available for the federally convicted defendant who petitions for collateral relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) by applying the Sykes test to the federal defendant who fails to
comply with the timing requirements for objections of FED. R. CRIM. P. 12. In Davis v.
United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), the Court took the first step toward this result by inter-
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If the state courts are as interested as the Supreme Court thinks
they are in ending litigation, many may read S)*es as an invitation to
end the apparently growing trend of the state courts to reach the
merits of claims unraised at trial:237 The states may begin enforcing
their procedural bars more strictly,238 or may enact contemporaneous

objection -ruleswhere such rules do not already exist, or strain in their
own post-conviction review to avoid any mention of constitutional
claims not raised at trial.2 39 Some states may even consider repealpreting the "cause shown" restriction of Rule 12(f) to bar collateral relief for a late challenge
to a grand jury selection process. See notes 68-70 supra and accompanying text. Because Congress, after Davis, amended Rule 12(b)(2) to bar review of any motion or objection that could
have been made pretrial, it may have sub silentio adopted the Davis Court's interpretation of
Rule 12's bar. (At issue in Davis was whether Rule 12's bar applied to collateral as well as to
direct attack; the Rule is silent on that point.) Congress' and the Court's work with Rule 12
suggests that the Court is moving to eliminate any distinction between the relief available on
direct and collateral attack for at least the federally convicted defendant.
237. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 485, 489 (1977) (state appellate court
reached merits on constitutional claim first raised by defendant on motion for new trial after
conviction). See also Shapiro, supra note 141, at 369.
238. Justice Rehnquist suggested that the state courts have been reaching the merits of
even those issues deemed forfeited: The states have assumed under Fay that the federal habeas
courts will decide those issues notwithstanding the state procedural bar, and at least wish to
have their own views on the merits considered by the federal courts. Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 89-90 (1977); see Shapiro, supra note 141, at 348. Justice Rehnquist cited no
examples to support his suggestion, and Sykes and Francis both belie his concern, since in
neither case did the state court decide the merits of the claim. Nor did Justice Rehnquist
identify the harm that would result if state courts did reach the merits. His argument appears inconsistent with the Stone Court's assumption that state courts will protect federal constitutional rights as faithfully as would the federal habeas courts. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 493-94 n.35 (1976).
239. Identifying the basis of a state appellate court's denial of relief-on the merits or
through enforcement of a procedural bar-will become a difficult and tension-producing
process. State courts that enforce a procedural bar may justifiably fear that any comment
about the constitutional issues presented by the defendant on appeal will be interpreted by a
federal habeas court, upset about the procedural bar and eager to remedy a perceived wrong,
as a decision on the merits. See Irwin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (1959); Hart, supra note 54, at
110 (criticizing Irwin Court's conclusion that state courts had decided merits); cf. United
States ex re. Harding v. Marks, 541 F.2d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 1976) (Hunter, J., dissenting)
(court of appeals reached merits ofjury instruction issue that counsel had not raised at trial
where state courts denied relief without opinion; because issue fundamental, state court's decision held to have been on merits). In contrast, some habeas courts may strain to conclude
that the state did not decide the federal constitutional issue. Cf. Taylor v. Kentucky, 98 S.
Ct. 1930, 1933 n.10 (1978) (holding that state court had reached merits of federal constitutional issue, after several Justices during oral argument questioned whether state courts had
done so; oral argument reported at 23 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 4006-07 (1978)). In light of
Irwin and Taylor, state courts will craft their opinions to indicate whether they are reaching
the merits of the federal constitutional issue. But state courts cannot block federal habeas by
refusing to address federal constitutional issues fairly raised by the defendant. Cf Smith v.
Dagnon, 434 U.S. 332 (1978) (per curiam) (habeas court cannot deny habeas petition by
relying on failure of state court to mention constitutional issue in its opinion). As a result,
federal habeas courts will be burdened with reviewing the petitioner's and the government's
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ing their statutory authorization of appellate review of constitutional
issues litigated before the defendant pleads guilty if that review
2 4°
would authorize federal habeas review.
This new "double-or-nothing" rule for access to federal habeas
review might be justified if it helped fulfill the Burger Court's implicit goal of reducing the strain in the relationship between the state
and federal courts. But the decision to reaffirm Brown while restricting Fay may actually exacerbate that strain. Federal reversal of a
state court's decision on the merits of a constitutional issue-a reversal which in effect tells a state court that its constitutional analysis is
faulty-may irritate the state court more than a reversal on a consti241
tutional issue that the state for procedural reasons chose to ignore.
Moreover, the state court and the federal habeas court may enter a
tense struggle over whether the state court in fact reached the merits
and thereby invited habeas review under Brown.2 42
If the Supreme Court sincerely wants constitutional claims to be
settled once and for all in the state courts, it may have pressured the
state courts in precisely the wrong way. State trial courts will now
be reluctant to intervene to protect a defendant who has not objected
at trial, and state appellate courts will be reluctant to consider on
appeal any federal constitutional issue raised there for the first
time.2 43
2.

Limiting Brown: a missed opportunity or the lesser of two evils?

If the Supreme Court wants to encourage the state courts to protect the defendant's constitutional rights and thereby reduce the
workload of the federal habeas courts and federal intrusion into state
affairs, 244 one wonders why it ignored its opportunity to restrict the
briefs in the state litigation to determine whether petitioner complied with the state's procedural rule in raising federal constitutional issues presented on habeas.
240. Cf. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975) (federal habeas available where
state permits review of suppression motion after guilty plea).
241. While no surveys have sought the reaction of state court judges, this hypothesis
seems reasonable, since Brown apparently generates more habeas litigation than does Fay. See
Shapiro, supra note 141, at 369-70; cf. Friendly, supra note 14, at 169 n.139 (similar evaluation
of federal reversals of state courts on Miranda grounds).
242. See note 239 supra and accompanying text.
243. The Court may feel that these pressures on the state courts will indirectly serve to
encourage defendants to raise their claims at trial, but, as noted above, this belief is based on
an extremely unrealistic assessment of the motives and abilities of state trial lawyers. See
notes 221-32 sura and accompanying text.
244. If due process does not require the states to create a post-conviction, collateral
review process, cf. Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965) (per curiam) (issue of whether state
must provide collateral review of federal constitutional issues moot where state adopted such
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scope of the Brown v. Allen principle instead of the Fay principle. This
is not to suggest that limiting Brown is a just solution to the problems
of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.2 45 But examining this potential
alternative to Estelle, Francir,and Sykes helps to demonstrate the unfortunate and ironic consequences of the "cause and prejudice" test.
It also suggests what the Court may yet have in store for the Brown
principle.
Stone v. Powell virtually eliminated- federal relitigation of fourth
amendment issues, but also laid the groundwork for an even broader
limitation on Brown. The defendants in Stone, unlike those in Estelle,
Francis, and Sykes, had raised their federal constitutional claims at
trial. Both the state trial and appellate courts had decided the
fourth amendment motions to suppress-erroneously, according to
the federal courts of appeal--on collateral review. Despite Brown,
however, the Supreme Court forbade federal habeas review of those
state court decisions. 246
Writing for the majority in Stone, Justice Powell compared the
247
costs and benefits of habeas review of a fourth amendment issue,
using the same sort of analysis that the Court undertook in Sykes.
Because evidence seized illegally is ordinarily reliable, the Stone
Court thought that the government's use of that evidence would not
jeopardize the accuracy of the guilt-determination process.2 48 Nor
did the fourth amendment itself require that a federal habeas court
review the constitutionality of the challenged search or seizure-the
exclusionary rule was viewed as a judicially created remedy for a
249
fourth amendment violation rather than as an independent right.
In Stone the Court did not say that it would extend that decision's
restriction on the federal habeas review authorized by Brown to other
procedure after state courts denied review), one would think that the Burger Court would be
searching for a carrot to induce state courts to provide post-conviction review of federal constitutional claims.
245. Indeed, some commentators have urged that Brown be overruled. See Bator, Finalil in CriminalLaw and FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REv. 441, 523-28

(1963); Friendly, supra note 14, at 155; Address by the Hon. Paul C. Reardon, President, Nat'l
Center for State Courts, at the Annual Dinner of the Section of Judicial Administration,
A.B.A., San Francisco (Aug. 14, 1972), quoted in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
263-64 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). Moreover, the legislative effort to restrict federal
habeas jurisdiction has focused on Brown more than on Fay. See S. 567, 93d Cong., Ist Sess.
(1973) (no federal habeas review if issue was raised and determined, there was fair and adequate opportunity to have had it raised and determined, or it still could be raised and
determined).
246. The chorus criticizing Stone grows. See commentary cited in note 25 supra.
247. 428 U.S. at 489-95, especially n.31.
248. Id at 490.
249. Id at 486.

November 19781

FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS

constitutional claims, nor has the Court done so in the two opportunities it has had so far--cases involving alleged violations of Miranda
rights 25 0 or improper grand jury selection. 25 ' But to extend Stone to
cases involving grand jury challenges252 and the Miranda safeguards,25 3 or to any rights or remedies whose violation does not jeopardize the accuracy of the petit jury's verdict, would be consistent
with Stone's emphasis on the question of guilt and innocence, which
is also the focus of the guilt-innocence question suggested by the new
"actual prejudice standard.125 4 Therefore, if the Court had realized
250. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). Brewer involved, among other things,
the defendant's alleged waiver of Miranaawarnings. The Court affirmed reversal of the state
court's decision to admit the defendant's uncounseled statements without discussing whether
Stone should bar federal habeas review of the merits. The majority chose not to discuss Stone's
applicability despite Chief Justice Burger's ringing dissent in which he urged that Stone
should bar relief Id at 426-28 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). Justice Powell, who concurred, did
not support extending Stone, because the parties had not briefed the issue. Id at 414 (Powell,
J., concurring). But the Court's presentation of Brewer more as a sixth amendment than as a
Miranda issue, see id at 397-98, is not inconsistent with its analysis in Estele and Skes: The
defendant's decision to forego an attorney, whether the right to counsel comes from the fifth
amendment or the sixth, must be analyzed injohaono. Zerbst waiver terms and may therefore
survive the new restrictions on Fay. See note 54 s.upra.
251. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). In Castaneda, the Court affirmed the
court of appeals' conclusion that the state had not proved that the grand jury that had indicted the defendant had been constitutionally selected. Although the defendant had not
complied with the state's procedural rule governing the timing of objections to grand juries,
the Texas state courts had ignored that failure and decided the merits of the defendant's
claim against him, and so the Court was willing to review the merits. Id at 485-86 n.4. In
reviewing the merits, the majority did not discuss whether Stone should bar collateral review.
But in his dissent Justice Powell suggested that Stone be extended to grand jury challenges.
Id at 508 n.1.
252. It is difficult to imagine, for example, how an unconstitutionally selected grand
jury would undermine the reliability of the petit jury's verdict. As Justice Powell argued in
Castaneda, to bar federal habeas review of a grand jury issue makes even more sense than
barring review of a fourth amendment issue, because the former involves no "flaw" in the
trial itself. Id at 508 n.l (Powell, J., dissenting).
253. The Court has held that the Miranda warnings, at least when the issue is not the
defendant's waiver of counsel, operate as prophylactic safeguards like the exclusionary rule of
the fourth amendment; they do not comprise a right themselves, but deter police violations of
the fifth amendment. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
254. See notes 130-79 supra and accompanying text. A question left open in Stone is
whether the defendant, who failed to use the "opportunity" to litigate the fourth amendment
issue, might get habeas review by showing cause and actual prejudice. The answer is probably
no: While he might show cause, the defendant could probably never show prejudice so long as
that test requires proof of factual innocence, because Stone assumed that the challenged evidence would not undermine the reliability of the jury's factfinding. However, because unconstitutionally seized evidence is not always probative, see Tushnet, sufra note 102, at
497-98 (noting Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972) (seized shotgun of different gauge from
one used in homicide), and Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (fabric sweepings from defendant's car)), the government's use of such unchallenged evidence might be so
prejudicial as to raise a due process issue that could undercut the accuracy of the jury's ver-
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that approving Brown v. Allen in Sykes might actually exacerbate the
federal-state tension it has sought to relieve, the Court might have
directed its narrowing attack at Brown rather than Fay by barring
habeas review-regardless of whether the state courts had decided
the merits--of at least those issues unrelated to the question of
255
guilt.
By embracing another element of the Stone holding, the Sykes
Court might have narrowed Brown even further. Stone barred
habeas review of fourth amendment issues whenever the state had
provided the defendant with "an opportunity for full and fair litigation" of that issue.2 51 Though the standards for such an opportunity
remain uncertain,25 7 the Sykes Court might have extended Stone by
barring federal collateral review of any issue decided on the merits, so
long as the state court had given the defendant sufficient opportunity
to argue the claim.2 51 The federal habeas court would then at most
dict. Cf Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 801 & n.1 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (troubled by whether introduction of shotgun of different gauge than
murder weapon was due process violation).
255. These issues might include "technical" defenses, like double jeopardy (but if based
on a state court reversal of conviction for insufficient evidence rather than a procedural violation, the double jeopardy claim is related to guilt-innocence, cf. Green v. Massey, 98 S. Ct.
2151 (1978) (jeopardy attaches if state court reversed because evidence insufficient; because
basis of reversal unclear, remand to determine basis)), an unconstitutionally selected grand
jury or discriminatory prosecution, that would end the proceedings without ajury decision on
the merits of guilt-innocence. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 141, at 1086-100. The issues
might also include the use of the exclusionary rule, which, though affecting the evidence
considered by the jury, is justified on grounds other than the reliability of the evidence involved. See Richardson v. Stone, 421 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (Stone bars review of
Miranda issue litigated in state courts).
Though Justice Brennan strongly dissented in Stone, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 502
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting), he cited the Stone holding in Syke, arguing the negative
pregnant that not even a procedural default should bar federal habeas review of a constitutional claim that bore on guilt and innocence. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 110 (1977)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
Congressional attempts to restrict federal habeas have focused on exclusionary rule issues. See Kleindienst Letter, supra note 146, at 2225.
256. 428 U.S. at 494.
257. See note 102 supra.
258. This approach assumes that it is more important to have every constitutional issue
decided by at least one court (whether a state court or federal habeas court) than it is to
relitigate those issues that the state courts have decided with the hope of increasing through
relitigation the possibility of an accurate resolution of the constitutional issue. This approach
would make the state court decision final, whereas it is currently only presumed correct, see 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1970), unless the issue involves the fourth amendment, see Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 (1976). This approach would also eliminate in most cases the need for the
federal habeas court to hold an evidentiary hearing. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293
(1963) (listing instances where habeas court should hold evidentiary hearing). Because the
habeas court would not redecide the constitutional issue, it would not need to hold a hearing
to help it redecide the historical facts or the constitutional significance of those facts.
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review the fairness and thoroughness of the state court process in deciding the merits, rather than reconsider the merits themselves.25 9
Limiting Brown in either of the ways suggested might therefore
have created a less restrictive alternative for federal habeas review
than limiting Fay. Francis and Sykes rest largely on Justice Rehnquist's highly questionable assumption that defense attorneys intentionally forego the opportunity to object.2 60 But as argued above,
many defense attorneys will continue to fail to object, out of negligence or inadvertence, even if they recognize the devastating consequences of such a failure under the new cause and prejudice test.
Had the Court chosen to restrict habeas review by limiting the scope
of Brown, a state court, aware that its decision on the constitutional
issue would be immune from federal habeas review on the merits,
259. In Stone the state courts had decided the fourth amendment issues. But Stone's use
of the word "opportunity" suggests that federal habeas might be barred even if the state court
did not decide the merits, so long as it gave the defendant a procedurally fair chance to raise
the claim. In Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977) (reversing panel's decision),
the Second Circuit held that Stone barred habeas review of a fourth amendment issue that the
defendant had not raised, and the state courts had not reviewed, because the defense could
have objected on that ground at trial. Defense counsel had objected at trial to the police
seizure of the disputed evidence, but not on fourth amendment grounds. Id. at 836. The
court of appeals reversed a panel's decision that had interpreted Stone as permitting federal
habeas review, in the absence of a Fay deliberate bypass, where the state courts had not
decided the merits of the claim. Id at 833. The court thought Stone had overruled Fay at
least with respect to fourth amendment issues, and that Stone had also overruled that part of
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), which had ordered a federal habeas court to conduct
an evidentiary hearing whenever the state proceedings---through no bypass of the defendant-had failed to develop crucial evidence. Federal habeas review was barred in Gates on
the ground that the state had not denied the defense an adequate opportunity to litigate the
fourth amendment issue, 568 F.2d at 839, even if the state court did not actually decide the
merits of the fourth amendment issue. The court suggested that the state would not provide
an "opportunity" to litigate a fourth amendment issue if it prevented the defendant from
exploring whether police testimony was perjured, see United States ex re. Petillo v. New
Jersey, 418 F. Supp. 686 (D.N.J. 1976), or if mob domination prevented the defendant from
raising the issue, see Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915). 568 F.2d at 840.
Gates restricts federal habeas more than did O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977), where the Fifth Circuit had barred habeas review of a
fourth amendment issue that counsel had not raised at trial, but where the state appellate
courts had a complete record of the facts relevant to that issue even though they denied
review of it. Even if Gates' interpretation of Stone's "opportunity" is correct, that interpretation should nevertheless not be extended to eliminate habeas review of other than fourth
amendment issues. To extend Stone to bar habeas relief on every federal constitutional issue
whenever the defense failed to capitalize on the opportunity to object would effectively eliminate habeas review and would mean that no court would decide the merits of the issue. The
restriction of Brown suggested in the text would apply only when the state court actually
decided the merits of the constitutional issue, and would restrict habeas review to an evaluation of the procedure whereby the state court had reached that decision.
260. See notes 221-32 supra and accompanying text.
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might be more willing to confront the constitutional claims of criminal defendants.
For example, assuming a limitation on Brown, the state court
might intervene to determine what federal constitutional questions
counsel had not raised and why counsel had not done so. That intervention would better protect the defendant against an inept, negligent, disloyal, or unperceptive attorney, and would eliminate the
stark difference between the protection afforded a defendant whose
counsel raises claims at trial and one whose counsel does not. It
would also properly limit enforcement of the state's procedural bar to
those cases where both the attorney and defendant agreed not to object and therefore committed a deliberate bypass. Finally, limiting
Brown rather than Fay might have eliminated one form of friction
caused by Brown-the conclusion by the federal court that the state
court had wrongly decided the constitutional issue 26 -and also reduced the workload of the federal habeas courts as well. 62
3.

The vices of the lesser of two evils.

Despite these apparent benefits of limiting Brown, that approach,
when compared to the new Sykes rule, has such drawbacks that it
may have value chiefly as a hypothesis to illustrate some of the intractable dilemmas of federal habeas corpus and the Burger Court's
failure to justly or even rationally deal with them. The first drawback is the uncertainty that state courts, encouraged by a limitation
of Brown to play an active role in protecting federal constitutional
rights, will actually protect those rights. Freed from federal habeas
review, the state courts might respond to local pressure to convict
defendants at the expense of vigorous enforcement of federal consti261. Any form of federal habeas review will interfere with state interests in some way.
Under Slone, for example, the habeas court must determine whether the state's procedure for
litigating fourth amendment issues was "full and fair." See Flagg, supra note 25, at 169-70.
See also Note, supra note 142, at 422-30 (comparing federal with Iowa state habeas statutes to
determine whether latter were equivalent of former). If for a procedure to be "full and fair"
the state must create a collateral review process and test the defendant's failure to object by
the cause and prejudice standard, butsee note 259 supra, Sone would interfere enormously with
the interest of the state in creating its own procedure and in ending litigation. Moreover, the
new habeas decisions do not permit a state to bar, through its procedural rule, federal habeas
review completely, because Francis and Sykes did graft the cause and prejudice test onto state
rules in each case.
262. Though there are no statistics to support the assumption, defense attorneys probably obect--tnd thereby preserve claims for later review-more frequently than they fail to
object. If th\s assumption is correct, the Court could have reduced the federal habeas workload more by restricting Brown than by enforcing state contemporaneous objection rules. Of
course, such a restriction might have added to the Court's own docket by increasing certiorari
petitions from state denial of the merits of objections. See Tushnet, sura note 102, at 494.
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tutional rights. Whether that result would occur is a question that
will continue to divide judges and commentators,2 6 3 because there is
no way to test empirically the state judicial response to any limitation of Brown. 264
Second, limiting Brown instead of Fay might still, in its own way,
increase tensions between the federal and state courts. Under this
approach, the federal habeas court would examine the constitutional
issue in the one instance where the state had clearly announced that
it wanted to end litigation and seal the conviction. Third, although
the state courts might still receive "instruction" in the meaning of
federal constitutional rights if federal courts continued (perhaps
through their supervisory power) to reconsider federal constitutional
issues raised by federal defendants on collateral attack, 26 5 to limit
Brown might also end the fruitful "dialogue" between state and federal courts in interpreting federal constitutional issues that habeas
review provides.2 66 Finally, to limit Brown but not Fay would force
the federal habeas court to develop a record of the information relevant to the constitutional claim, raised for the first time on collateral
attack, without help from the state court that had enforced its procedural bar-a problem that the Sykes Court understandably wanted
to avoid.
263. See Flagg, supra note 25, at 162-63 (listing commentators who express distrust of
state courts). Compare Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 511 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.) (separate
opinion) (state courts may not protect federal constitutional rights), with Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976) (disagreeing with this fear).
Mincey v. Arizona, 98 S. Ct. 2408 (1978), illustrates the disturbing potential of Stone.
There, on direct appeal the Court reversed the Arizona Supreme Court's application of a
homicide scene exception to the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule. In a pre-Mincqy case,
Sample v. Eyman, 469 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1972), a federal habeas court had ruled that exception unconstitutional. Nonetheless, following Stone, the Arizona Supreme Court reapplied
the exception, apparently on the ground that the earlier decision by the federal habeas court
was no longer controlling. Mincey v. Arizona, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2419 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
concurring). AMincg suggests that Stone may increase the Supreme Court's workload if the
Court must now accept more direct appeals to correct state court decisions which before Stone
could have been left to the habeas courts to correct, and that Stone's assumption that state
courts will fairly enforce federal constitutional rights is questionable.
264. Certainly no judge would ever admit, if asked, that he or she had denied a claim
because of community pressure to convict, even if aware that the denial was unreviewable by
a federal habeas court.
265. A state defendant's argument that denying him or her federal habeas review while
giving that review to a defendant convicted of a federal crime violated the equal protection
clause would probably not succeed. Cf Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (no equal protection violation in refusing to appoint counsel for indigent who petitions state or United States
Supreme Court for review).
266. See genera'ly Cover & Aleinikoff, sura note 141.
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If the Supreme Court had decided to limit Brown rather than Fay,
it would probably not have been blocked by either constitutional or
legislative barriers. In Estelle, Francis,Sykes, and Stone, the Court obviously did not believe that the supremacy clause entitled the defend2 67
ant to review by a federal court of his federal constitutional rights.
And if Congress' implicit approval of Brown and Fay in its 1966
amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 2254268 did not stop the Francir/Sykes
Court from arrogating the power to decide when federal courts
should exercise federal jurisdiction in the absence of a defense objection, neither would section 2254 stop the Court from choosing not to
follow Brown.269
But limiting Brown might well have underscored, rather than
solved, the vexing problems of federal habeas review faced by a
Court anxious to promote comity, federalism, and finality over the
need for a federal forum for constitutional claims. And as the next
part shows, the Burger Court, in seeking an abrupt solution to these
problems, may have created a new and unforeseen problem that it
has not yet armed the federal habeas courts to solve.
IV.

THE SYKES BACKLASH: OUTFLANKING "CAUSE AND

PREJUDICE" BY ATTACKING ATTORNEY INCOMPETENCE

The ultimate ironic consequence of the cause and prejudice test is
that by severely restricting access to federal habeas review for defendants whose counsel failed to make a timely claim, the Court has invited defendants to transform their constitutional claims into attacks
267. In none of the decisions did the Court even discuss the relevancy of the Constitution to its decisions. The Supreme Court may believe that no procedural due process prob-

lem exists if at least one court decides the merits of the constitutional issue. Cf Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 606 & n.18 (1975) (raising issue, without deciding, whether state
litigant whose movie theater was closed pursuant to state nuisance law has right to federal
court determination of federal constitutional issues). But see Tushnet, supra note 102, at
493-94 (arguing that supremacy clause and Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 constitutionally required review by federal court of constitutional issues). Other proposals that would affect
Brown and Fay by creating a new federal appellate court to review habeas petitions or by
restructuring the present federal appellate courts appear to assume that federal review of
some sort is either constitutionally or statutorily required. See P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR
& M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 114-20 (1976); Friendly, supra note 142, at 634-35;
Haynsworth, supra note 14, at 604-07.
268. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970); see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 528-29 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
269. In amending § 2254, Congress did not explicitly enact the holdings of Fay and
Townsend v. Sain, but instead indicated how the federal habeas courts should treat a determination on the merits by a state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1970). This does not mean
that the constitutional or statutory questions are as easily dismissed as the Court apparently
thought. But if the Court could ignore those questions in Francrand Sykes, it could have done
the same in limiting Brown.
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on their counsel's competence. The Court may therefore have subjected the federal habeas courts to an increased workload from both
the new attacks on attorney incompetence and the need for a sharper
definition of the attorney's responsibility in preserving federal claims.
Though this strategy may create serious tensions in the attorney-client relationship, it may be the only resort for defendants whose path
to federal habeas review has been blocked by Sykes.
A.

Attacking Counsel- The OnIy Open Road

The Supreme Court has long recognized that legal representation
is essential to the criminal defendant, 2 70 and has interpreted the Constitution to give counsel to defendants in almost every situation.2 7 '
The individual's decision to forego counsel must meet the exacting
waiver test of Johnson v. Zerbst. 7 2 The waiver is effective only if the
defendant understands the significance of the decision, and any
doubt about that understanding must be resolved in the defendant's
favor.

27 3

If counsel is necessary to protect the defendant, Estelle, Francis,
and Sykes demonstrate that counsel is also the only protection the
defendant usually receives. The adversary process pits the counseled
defendant against the government. The trial court need not intercede to protect the defendant, 27 4 even if counsel has not challenged
some governmental conduct presumed to be prejudicial, so long as
that failure to object might stem from a tactical judgment. 5
270. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
271. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (any prosecution where jail sentence
possible); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (felonies).
272. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
273. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806
(1975).
274. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501,
512 (1976).
275. In Estelle, for example, the trial court was not obligated to intercede even though
the court of appeals had decided several years earlier that the defendant's appearance in jail
clothes was inherently prejudicial. Cf United States v. Williams, 544 F.2d 1215, 1218 (4th
Cir. 1976) (no duty to mention statutory right to defendant even if refusal to grant right upon
request creates irrebuttable presumption of harm).
Judges may, however, be understandably uncertain about their responsibility. The
judge may be required to intercede if he or she recognizes the error, see Sincox v. United
States, 571 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1978) (during polling of jurors, juror said he had "reasonable
doubt" about guilty verdict), or if counsel says something, however vague and inarticulate,
that sounds like a constitutional objection, cf. Taylor v. Kentucky, 98 S. Ct. 1930 (1978)
(defense counsel's requested instructions should have alerted judge to constitutional issues).
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Only the defendant's objection can force the government to establish the constitutional foundation to admit certain evidence; the
trial court need not, sua sponte, determine whether the government's
conduct meets constitutional standards. 7 6 The trial court need not
ask counsel whether he has in fact decided not to object or why he
made that decision, no matter how easily it could make that inquiry.277 Nor must the prosecutor oversee the defense attorney to
ensure that the latter adequately represents the client. 8
By failing to object, then, defense counsel can bar his client from
review by any court of the merits of a constitutional issue.2 7 9 Apparently, according to Estelle, Francis, and Skes, counsel need not consult with the client or adequately research either the law or the facts
before making that decision. Given the attorney's power, and the
catastrophic consequences of ineffective representation, 8 ° the attor28
ney's conduct itself is likely to become an issue on collateral attack. 1
Estelle, Francis, and Sykes do not discuss whether the defendant can
276. In S)ykes, for example, both the district court and court of appeals, see Wainwright
v. Sykes, 528 F.2d 522, 525 (5th Cir. 1976), thought that Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368
(1964), required that the trial court conduct a hearing to determine whether the defendant's
confession was constitutionally admissible, even if counsel did not object. The Supreme
Court disagreed, holding thatJackson established the procedure to determine that issue, but
did not guarantee a hearing to the defendant without an objection. Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 86 (1977).
In contrast, to protect the defendant's right to counsel, the trial court may be required to
warn the defendant of potential conflicts of interest in multiple representation cases. Cf.
Holloway v. Arkansas, 98 S. Ct. 1173, 1178.(1978) (reserving question whether trial court
must sua sponte warn defendants of potential conflicts). Compare United States v. Lawriw,
568 F.2d 98 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1607 (1978) (trial court must advise multiple
defendants of potential danger in representation by single attorney and of right to own counsel), with Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1975) (obligation to anticipate
reasonably foreseeable conflicts of interest at time of counsel's appointment, but no obligation
to warn co-defendants of potential disadvantages of joint representation).
277. The trial court could conduct a sidebar conference during the trial or a pretrial
conference, or could ask the attorney to prepare a checklist of his or her decisions. See Tague,
The Attempt to Improve Criminal Defense Representation, 15 AM. GRIM. L. R-v. 109, 161-65
(1977).
278. The "plain error" doctrine provides some check on the government's abuse of
power. See 8B MOORE, supra note 105, 1 52.02[2] & n.10. Defining "actual prejudice" more
restrictively than "plain error" would eliminate this check. The Supreme Court is not quick
to impose guidelines on prosecutorial conduct. Cf Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,
365 & n.9 (1978) (noting suggested guidelines on prosecutor's conduct but holding that due
process was not violated where prosecutor increased charges when defendant refused initial
plea offer).
279. While Stone was not pitched as a constitutional decision and does not explicitly
require that the defendant's claim be litigated in any court, the thrust of Stone appears to be
that due process guarantees the defendant the opportunity to litigate his claim in either state
or federal court. See note 267 supra.
280. See note 129 spia and accompanying text.
281. Cf United States ex re..Smith v. DiBella, 314 F. Supp. 446 (D. Conn. 1970) (state
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reframe what would have been an attack on the government's conduct into an attack on the attorney's representation. In each case,
the Court was spared that analysis by appellate counsel's decision not
to press that claim.2 82
But unlike Fay, Estelle, Francis, and Sykes pressure the defendant
to attack counsel's effectiveness rather than, or in addition to, the
government's conduct that counsel did not challenge. 3 Concurring
in Sykes, Justice White all but invited the defendant to attack counsel's competency for failing to object, 8 4 an attack that some federal
habeas courts have also implied that the defendant must make in
order to get collateral review. 8 5
To permit the defendant to attack counsel's conduct on collateral
review is justified by the reasons for habeas review. The habeas
court could not infer that the defendant waived a challenge to counsel's ineffectiveness by not objecting at trial, and counsel could not
himself waive an attack on his own representation. Moreover,
evidence of ineffectiveness is usually outside the record on direct approcedural rule holding that failure to object worked automatic forfeiture was equivalent to
state determination that that failure was ineffective representation).
282. In Francis, for example, appellate counsel decided for "political" reasons not to
attack the trial attorney as ineffective, perhaps because the trial attorney was a noted minority civil rights lawyer. Interview with appellate counsel (Mar. 28, 1978). In S kes, trial counsel represented the defendant through the state appellate process, and obviously did not
challenge his own effectiveness. Sykes' appointed attorney on federal habeas attack chose not
to raise the issue, because he wanted to avoid a remand to the state courts to exhaust the issue.
Sykes therefore stipulated to his trial counsel's effectiveness, a stipulation that appellate counsel later regretted. Interview with appellate counsel (Mar. 15, 1978). In Estdle, appellate
counsel elected not to press the claim in the Supreme Court as an alternative ground to affirm
the Fifth Circuit's decision. Interview with appellate counsel (Mar. 18, 1977). The federal
district court in that case had decided that trial counsel had not been ineffective in allowing
his client to wear jail clothes in court. Williams v. Beto, 364 F. Supp. 335, 339 (S.D. Tex.
1973).
283. Because Fay permitted habeas review so long as the defendant himself did not
bypass the objection, the defendant did not need to attack counsel's effectiveness. Although
Hen., a Missisfpi may have barred federal habeas where counsel bypassed the objection,
Hen, apparently did not result in an increase in ineffectiveness claims. See Shapiro, supra
note 141, at 348-49.
284. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 99 (1977) (White, J., concurring).
285. Many opinions note that the defendant did not challenge the attorney's competency in failing to object. See Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc);
Mildwoffv. Cunningham, 432 F. Supp. 814, 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (absent claim of incompetency, defendant bound by counsel's decisions); United States ex re. Brown v. Warden, 417 F.
Supp. 970, 974 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (without charge of incompetency, court unwilling to make
"cynical assumption" necessary to distrust counsel's conclusion that issue frivolous); Sf Crowell v. Zahradnick, 571 F.2d 1257, 1259 n.2 (4th Cir. 1977) (suggesting defendant could turn
counsel's failure to object into charge of ineffective representation).
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peal and can be developed and presented only on collateral attack.2 86
Further, the Supreme Court has always assumed that counsel could
deliberately bypass raising a federal claim in the state courts only
if his or her decision was competent. 8 7 And several courts have
held that counsel's failure to object constitutes ineffective
representation. 288
B.

The Defendant-s New Strategy

By alleging ineffective representation in his petition, the defendant may be able to outflank the Court's attempt to limit habeas review even though the basis of ineffectiveness is simply counsel's
failure to object. In Cooper v. Fizharn,28 9 for example, on federal
habeas, petitioner challenged his counsel's competency for her failure
to move to suppress the fruits of a search at his state court trial. The
federal district court denied the petition, concluding that the admission of the items seized was harmless error, whether or not the search
was constitutional. 2 9 A panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, and, in remanding for the district court to decide whether
counsel had been ineffective, stated that the district court could not
ignore the issue of ineffectiveness by determining the merits of the
motion that counsel had failed to make. 29 ' The panel held that a
286. On direct appeal an appellate court will usually consider only those issues
presented by the trial record and will not accept any additional evidence. See United States
v. Huntley, 535 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1976). This limitation may explain the clever approach
taken by a panel of the District of Columbia Circuit in permitting an attack on counsel's
effectiveness by a motion for new trial, which permits augmentation of the record on direct
appeal. See United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rehearing No. 721283 (D.C. Cir., filed Oct. 19, 1976), vacated, Mar. 17, 1977 (en banc) (decision pending).
287. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963); cf. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258
(1973) (attack on guilty plea barred unless counsel's pre-plea advice is outside "range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases").
288. See Saltys v. Adams, 465 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1972) (failure to object to highly questionable identification procedure constitutes ineffective representation); cf Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,59 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part) (issue of counsel's effectiveness in
regard to failure to raise fourth amendment claim not moot even if failure to grant claim was
harmless error). Other such decisions have involved direct appeals. See United States v.
Easter, 539 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1976) (counsel's failure to object to police search constituted
ineffective representation); People v. Ibarra, 40 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863
(1963) (failure to object to introduction of contraband seized in questionable search ineffective representation). But see LiPuma v. Commissioner, Dep't of Corrections, 560 F.2d 84 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977) (strategic decision not to file suppression motion not
ineffective representation); United States v. Elksnis, 528 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975) (failure to
object to jury instruction not ineffective representation).
289. 551 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1977), reheating en bane ordered, Sept. 22, 1977 (decision
pending).
290. Id at 1163-64.
291. Id at 1164-66. The district court found that the failures of the trial counsel did
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finding of ineffective representation required automatic reversal even
if counsel's ineffectiveness had not prejudiced the defendant. 9 2 Automatic reversal was necessary as a prophylactic remedy to protect
the sixth amendment right to counsel. 93 The panel suggested that
representation was sufficient if counsel "is prepared and conducts the
defense with reasonable knowledge and skill with an exercise of
knowledgeable choices of trial tactics. '294 Because Cooper's attorney
recognized that the admissibility of the seized evidence presented several constitutional issues, but did not research those issues or decide
not to object for any tactical reason,2 95 her representation, based on
the panel's test, was probably ineffective. 9 6
If other courts follow the approach of the panel in Cooper, federal
habeas petitioners will not only receive more frequent review by arguing ineffective representation, but will also have a better chance of
obtaining relief than if they only sought habeas review of the merits
of the issue that counsel did not raise. Cooper thus undercuts the
Court's attempt in Estelle, Francis, and Sykes to limit the availability
of both habeas review and relief. The admissions by Cooper's attorney at the habeas hearing would probably not constitute "cause" to
excuse the failure to object, and Cooper had obviously not established that the failure to object had "prejudiced" him.
C.

The Court7s New Task

As a result of this new defense strategy, the Supreme Court will
have to explain when the failure to object constitutes ineffective repnot "rise to the level of making the trial a sham or mockery of justice," but the court of
appeals held that this was the wrong standard for testing ineffectiveness. Id
292. d at 1165.
293. Id
294. id at 1166.
295. Id at 1163 n.1.
296. The panel remanded the case to the district court to determine the ineffectiveness
issue. Id at 1166.
There remains a question of the type of relief petitioner receives if counsel's representation is found ineffective. The federal habeas court may not reverse the conviction for a new
trial, but will instead remand to the state court to rule on the issue counsel did not raise. If
the state court rules against the petitioner-and the pressure will be great to do just that-it
will obviously not reverse the conviction. If the state court rules for petitioner, it may still not
reverse if it applies the harmless error test. Either decision by the state court may be open to
relitigation on federal habeas, absent the application of Stone. See, e.g., United States ex rel
Rosner v. Commissioner, Dep't of Corrections, 421 F. Supp. 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), re'd sub
non. LiPuma v. Commissioner, Dep't of Corrections, 560 F.2d 84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 861 (1977) (where all issues raised on appeal heard in state court, Stone precludes federal
habeas corpus relief).
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resentation. The Court has never clearly defined the standard for
ineffective representation.2 9 7 Forced to do so now, the Court will
probably adopt the standard established in McMann v. Richardson298
to test whether to overturn the guilty plea of a defendant who seeks
post-conviction review of an issue that counsel did not raise before
the defendant pleaded guilty. McMann held that the post-conviction
court should not review the merits of that issue, but should instead
examine whether counsel's erroneous advice about that issue had

made his client's guilty plea unintelligent. The post-conviction
court should grant relief only if counsel's advice fell outside "the
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. "299
But even assuming that McMann states the test for ineffective representation, it does not explain how the federal habeas courts should

apply that test. Courts have been divided in their interpretation of
cMann. Many have replaced the "farce" standard with a test that
asks whether the attorney's performance was reasonable. 30 0 Yet they
297. Several Justices have urged the Court to clarify the constitutional standard for
effective representation. See Maryland v. Marzullo, 98 S. Ct. 1885 (1978) (White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari where court of appeals had applied "within
range of competency" test to reverse district court); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 553
n.4 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court has twice failed to explain the relationship
between the failure to object and ineffective representation. In Browder v. Director, Dep't of
Corrections, 434 U.S. 257 (1978), the district court, on collateral attack, reversed the defendant's conviction, deciding the merits of a fourth amendment claim that petitioner had not
raised at trial and that the state appellate courts had not decided. On certiorari, following
the court of appeals' reversal of the district court's decision, petitioner-defendant suggested
that his attorney's incompetency deprived him of the opportunity for "full and fair litigation"
of his fourth amendment claim. Petitioner's Brief in the Supreme Court of the United States
at 46. The Supreme Court did not discuss whether that failure amounted to ineffectiveness,
or whether ineffectiveness permitted federal habeas review of the fourth amendment issue,
but reinstated the district court's decision because the state had not filed a timely notice of
appeal from the district court's decision.
In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), where counsel had not made a fourth
amendment motion to suppress, the Court ducked the ineffectiveness issue because the court
of appeals had found the admission of the unchallenged evidence harmless error. Id at 54.
Dissenting on this point, Justice Harlan thought that the harmlessness of counsel's failure did
not moot the issue of whether his failure to object was ineffective representation. id at 59
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Unfortunately, Justice Harlan did not explain the relationship between the merits of the issue counsel failed to raise and counsel's effectiveness.
298. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
"felfann
suggests that the habeas court must consider the signifi299. d at 770-71.
cance of the particular failure to object rather than whether counsel's overall performance,
apart from the failure to object, was competent. But see Williams v. Beto, 364 F. Supp. 335,
339 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (counsel's overall performance competent even if he failed to challenge
defendant's appearance in jail clothes), afd on other grounds sub non Estelle v. Williams, 425
U.S. 501 (1976).
300. See, e.g, Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974); Moore v. United
States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970); see Note, Ine.JctioeAssistance of Counse" Who Bears the Burden
of Proof?, 29 BAYLOR L. Rav. 29, 32-35 (1977) (listing cases and commentators).
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have not settled two questions of vital importance to the Burger
Court's attempt to limit habeas relief: First, what part the harm
caused by counsel's failure plays in deciding whether to reverse, and,
second, assuming that the question of harm is relevant, whether the
defendant carries the burden of proving how his counsel's failure
prejudiced him, or whether the government must instead prove that
counsel's error was harmless." t The answers to these questions will
obviously affect the implementation of Francis, Skes, and Estelle. If
a court chooses, as the panel appeared to do in Cooper, to reverse
automatically-without a finding of actual prejudice--once it finds
that counsel's performance did not meet the McMann standard, that
choice will make it easier for the defendant to obtain habeas relief by
arguing ineffective representation than by asking for collateral review of the merits of the constitutional issue that counsel did not
raise.
To protect its work in Estelle, Francis, and Sykes, then, the
Supreme Court has two options. First, it could simply eliminate
ineffective representation as an issue on habeas review if counsel
failed to raise an issue that itself would be barred from habeas review
because it is not guilt-related. 30 2 Were the Court to adopt this approach, it obviously would have to identify those issues that are not
guilt-related, the violation of which would never contribute to the
conviction of an innocent defendant. Because identifying those issues
would be difficult, 30 3 the Court is more likely to add a requirement to
the MMann test that the defendant show that his counsel's failure
301. Compare LiPuma v. Commissioner, Dep't of Corrections, 560 F.2d 84, 91 (2d Cir.),
cert
denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977) (defendant must prove actual prejudice; holding, however,
may reflect the Second Circuit's retention of generally rejected "farce" standard), and Beasley
v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974) (ineffectiveness where counsel deprived defendant of substantial defense; implying such finding required proof of prejudice), with United
States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rehearing No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir.,
Oct. 19, 1976), vacated, Mar. 17, 1977 (en banc) (decision pending).
302. A recent Senate bill anticipated the problem of petitioner's reconstructing his
habeas petition as an attack on counsel's competency for having failed to object, and would
have barred such attack whenever the unmade objection did not go to the reliability of the
verdict. S. 567, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1973); see H.R. 13,722, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972);
Kleindienst Letter, supra note 146, at 2224. See also LiPuma v. Commissioner, Dep't of Corrections, 560 F.2d 84, 93-94 n.6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977) (charge of ineffectiveness barred if based on fourth amendment claim which defendant had an opportunity to
litigate in state court).
303. Any constitutional issue that affects the evidence considered by the jury could contribute to a factually erroneous verdict. On the other hand, "technical" defenses that do not
control the evidence introduced at the trial are not related to factual guilt. See notes 152-75
supra and accompanying text.
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actually prejudiced him.:"' However, to add such a requirement
does seem inconsistent with McMann. A defendant who pleads
guilty, after all, admits his factual guilt.30 5 To warrant overturning
the plea, McMann does not require the defendant to prove that he
was factually innocent in addition to proving that his plea was not
intelligent. Moreover, to add that requirement would eliminate reversal as a prophylactic remedy to force counsel to protect his client.30 6 Because Estelle, Francis, and Skes expect that the attorney
304. The Court must also define "actual prejudice" as "factual innocence" to eliminate
the confusion in the courts of appeals' definitions of that term. Some courts have required
proof that counsel's ineffectiveness deprived the defendant of a guilt-related defense, see Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974) (reversal where counsel's ineffectiveness
stripped defendant of substantial defenses), but others have held that counsel's failure to
move to suppress evidence, the possession of which constituted a crime, deprived the defendant of a crucial defense, see United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1976). Easter
appears inconsistent with Stone, Francis, and Sykes, even if the suppression motion was the
defendant's only attack, because the non-objected-to evidence was obviously reliable, and the
failure to object did not endanger the accuracy of the verdict.
305. The trial judge must determine whether a factual basis for the plea exists. FED. R.
CIM. P. 11 (f). Of course, some defendants may admit factual guilt to get the advantage of
the plea bargain even if they are innocent. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)
(court can accept guilty plea of defendant who refuses to admit factual guilt if satisfied that
strong evidence of guilt exists). McMann would appear to bar inquiry into the factual basis of
an intelligent, voluntary plea.
306. On the other hand, an added requirement of prejudice is probably not inconsistent
with the Court's decisions in Holloway v. Arkansas, 98 S. Ct. 1173 (1978), or Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), in which the Court reversed automatically-apparently
without a showing of prejudice-where the trial court improperly required joint representation despite defense objections of conflict of interest. In Glasser,the trial court had refused to
honor the defendant's request for his own attorney, and had instead appointed for him an
attorney who had also represented a co-defendant. Because the trial court had thereby actively interfered with the defense, the Supreme Court refused to make "nice calculations as to
the amount of prejudice arising from [the] denial" of the defendant's request for his own
attorney. Id. at 76. Glasseris thus better understood as based on the denial of one's right to
a personal attorney than on denial of effective representation. Cf Holloway v. Arkansas, 98 S.
Ct. 1173, 1178-79 (1978) (trial court's refusal to appoint separate counsel "deprived petitioners of the guarantee of 'assistance of counsel' "). But the Glasser Court's comment that the
evidence against the defendant was not strong and was largely circumstantial, 315 U.S. at 67,
suggests that it was also applying something like a harmless error test and would ordinarily
require proof of prejudice. And the Court's denial of relief to Glasser's co-defendant, who
had not shown how he had been prejudiced by the error affecting Glasser, has been interpreted to mean that Glasserrequires proof of prejudice, see Geer, RepresentationofMulliple Criminal Defendants: Confcts of Interest and the ProfessionalRespoasibility of the Defense Attorney, 62
MINN. L. Rsv. 119, 122-25 (1978), even though that denial is probably better understood by
analogy to the standing requirement for the exclusionary rule. Ultimately, Glasser'sconstitutional test is so unclear that the decision will not prevent the Supreme Court from adopting
the prejudice requirement for claims of ineffective counsel. Moreover, Holloway and Glasser
involved direct appealS. Even if they are properly interpreted as excusing proof of prejudice,
the Court might not follow them when the claim of ineffective counsel arises in habeaspetitions.
The Cooper panel may therefore have improperly relied on at least Glasser to free the
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alone will protect the defendant, the attorney's representation should
be closely examined,
and courts should be willing to apply a prophy7
lactic remedy.

3

0

Yet even if the Burger Court can protect the Estelle, Francis, and
Sykes barriers to habeas relief by adding the requirement of prejudice
to the test for effective representation, the Court will not have relieved the habeas court of any work. The habeas court must still
develop the facts relevant to the motion that counsel did not make, as
it had to do in following Fay. If the habeas court decides that the
issue lacked merit, or that the failure to raise the issue did not actually prejudice the defendant, the court could deny the ineffectiveness
challenge without determining why counsel did not object. 308 But if
the habeas court cannot deny the petition on those grounds, it must
defendant from the obligation to prove that his counsel's failure to object had prejudiced him.
Cooperalso relied inaccurately on Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (trial court had
refused to permit counsel to speak with client during recess in latter's testimony), and Herring
v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (trial court refused to hear final argument by counsel
during bench trial), both cases where the trial courts had interfered with counsel's ability to
represent his client. Holloway, Glasser,Geders, and Herring all appear to suggest that the trial
court cannot intercede to inltefere with the defense, though it need not intervene to protect the
defendant from counsel.
307. The problem is deciding what the test for ineffective representation should be
designed to do. If designed as a prophylactic to help improve the performance of attorneys,
the defendant should not need to prove prejudice. Cf Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 98 S.
Ct. 1912, 1923-24 (1978) (discipline of attorney for breaching antisolicitation statute approved as prophylactic remedy even where client suffered no harm). If designed to protect
only the factually innocent defendant, the defendant must prove prejudice. If the latter is
the role played by the right to effective representation, some other method to discipline attorneys is essential, given the questionable performance of so many of them. See, e.g., Watkins v.
Green, 548 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1977) (in violation of state timing provisions, counsel failed to
object to grand and petit juries until day before trial; state courts and federal habeas courts
enforced state law and refused to decide merits; counsel had made same timing mistake in
earlier case where his objection, made on day before trial, had also been barred on appeal).
In his most recent caustic evaluation of the performance of attorneys, Chief Justice Burger
suggested that 50% of the trial lawyers are unqualified, an estimate based on questionable
evidence (the Chief Justice averaged other judicial estimates of from 25 to 75% without apparent regard for the numbers of attorneys practicing before the judges who gave the estimates), but nevertheless illustrating the Chief Justice's concern. The Washington Post, Feb.
13, 1978, at A4, col. 1-2.
308. See United States exrel Chambers v. Maroney, 408 F.2d 1186 (3d Cir. 1969) (failure to move to suppress evidence harmless error; no need to decide ineffective representation
claim), afd, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Spencer v. Cundiff, 413 F. Supp. 1246 (W.D. Va. 1976)
(counsel's failure to properly raise defendant's speedy trial motion not ineffective representation, since defendant not prejudiced by delay before trial). This approach appears fundamentally different from the panel's decision in Cooper, which required the habeas court to
treat the question of counsel's effectiveness separately from the merits of the issue that counsel
had failed to raise. Cooper suggested that habeas relief could be granted whenever the attorney should have objected, even if that failure did not prejudice the defendant. Cooper v.
Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 1977), rehearingen banc ordered,Sept. 22, 1977 (decision
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then determine why counsel did not object-the same determination
that it had to make under Fay in deciding deliberate bypass-in order to decide whether counsel's failure to object was a reasonable
decision.
Another disadvantage of pressuring the defendant to attack counsel's competency-assuming that that attack reopens access to federal
habeas review by circumventing the Sykes rule-is the effect of such a
tactic on the attorney-client relationship. To convert counsel's failure to object into a challenge to counsel's effectiveness may create
grave tension between counsel and client. In future habeas proceedings, the defendant will be pitted against his or her own attorney; the
latter's representation will always be exposed to attack. Of course,
some attorneys may respond positively by preparing their cases more
carefully and discussing every constitutional issue with the defendant
to gain agreement on any decision not to object, 0 9 or by documenting the reasons why they decided not to object. But many
other attorneys may respond by refusing court appointments, or by
making every possible objection at trial-thereby increasing the trial
court's workload--or by treating the client as a potential adversary
who therefore should not be consulted on trial strategy.
By cutting off access to federal habeas review of specific constitutional claims, the Court in Estelle, Francis, and Skes may have forced
defendants into this alternate strategy-a strategy that may have the
primary effect of increasing the federal court workload that those decisions were designed to reduce. As a result, one must question
whether the advantages that the Supreme Court sought to achieve in
Estelle, Francis, and Sykes outweigh the problems these decisions may
create.
pending). This is an approach the Burger Court must reject in order to avoid undercutting
Estelle, Francis, and Sykes.

If the Burger Court does not add the prejudice test, the job of the habeas court will be
more difficult in deciding counsel's effectiveness than in deciding, under Pay, the merits of the
issue that counsel did not raise. For, as in Cooper, the habeas court must then determine why
counsel did not object and whether counsel's failure was unreasonable, regardless of whether
an objection should have been granted.
Interestingly, to force the habeas court to decide the merits of the issue counsel failed to
raise would make the treatment of ineffective representation claims the same whether brought
by a habeas petitioner or by a defendant who sues his attorney for malpractice. See Martin v.
Hall, 20 Cal. App. 3d 414, 97 Cal. Rptr. 730 (2d Dist. 1971) (in malpractice suit, merits of
issue counsel did not raise is legal issue for trial court rather than for jury to decide).
309. The Court could have achieved this salutory consequence by further defining Fay
and Hen9, to require the attorney to consult with his client about every constitutional motion
to suppress, and to give counsel both the power to decide whether to object after that consultation and the power to make every decision during trial which he could not reasonably have
anticipated and which required an instant decision.
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CONCLUSION

By misinterpreting the reasons why defense attorneys fail to object, the Supreme Court has undervalued the importance of habeas
review for the defendant. No one can deny the unfairness of forcing
the government to suffer reversal of a conviction because defense
counsel, over whom the government has little control, has erred.
Nor can one deny the need to free the federal habeas courts from the
difficult tasks of deciding why counsel did not object and of hypothesizing about the possible prejudice to the defendant caused by counsel's failure. But it is more unfair for the defendant to suffer because
of his attorney's failure: Defendants need habeas review to protect
themselves from ineffective representation.
Ironically, the decisions in Estelle, Francis, and Sykes may aggravate the very problems in judicial administration that the Court
hoped to solve. Because defendants may be able to gain access to
federal habeas review by attacking the competency of counsel, the
new doctrines will not achieve and may even further frustrate the
Court's avowed goals of finality, federalism, and the administration
of justice. The Court should recognize that the three decisions are
misdirected, and then restore Fay. But if the Court does not-and
the language of the decisions surely suggests that it will not-the
Court should consider whether restricting Brown, as suggested in this
article, rather than restricting Fay is the better approach. Restricting Brown as suggested would at least ensure that the defendant received review by some court of the constitutional issues presented by
his case. Whatever the Court chooses to do, however, if it conceives
its role as finding a just and rational solution to the vexing problems
of federal habeas review, it now must recognize that its work has just
begun.

